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Civil-military coordination, in light of the humanitarian perspective, is an 
essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in 
humanitarian emergencies which are necessary to protect and promote 
humanitarian principles, to avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and 
when appropriate pursue common goals. It is also a responsibility which is 
commonly shared and is ensured by joint training and effective 
liaison between aid organizations and military. (UNOCHA, 2008, p. 8) 
A. BACKGROUND 
The ever-increasing frequency and rising magnitude of disasters, whether natural 
or man-made, challenges the present technologically advanced and well-equipped world 
to provide better relief in crisis situations. Whether it is a predicted or sudden disaster, the 
situation demands a swift, coordinated, and well-organized response to deliver efficient 
relief to survivors. Relief operations need to be conducted carefully to reduce human 
suffering. Traditionally, militaries have taken part in humanitarian relief operations all 
around the world. As Fredrick C. Cunny indicates, the public generally expects the 
military will reach out to assist the civilian population immediately in any emergency 
situation (Cunny, 1989). Due to its capabilities, resources, and ability to operate in a 
contingency environment, a military’s engagement depends on the magnitude and extent 
of destruction. The primary role of a military is to fight wars, as well as to plan, mobilize, 
engage, operate, and disengage at a fast pace in professional and disciplined manner. 
Therefore, their skills and assistance can be vital in any kind of emergency response. 
Furthermore, to implement an effective emergency response, military actors must 
collaborate with civil actors to ensure a high degree of coordination, without which the 
desired objectives cannot be achieved. Coordination among all civil relief actors and the 
military is of paramount importance; thus, this coordination requires detailed protocols 
and procedures.  
The United Nations (UN)-Oslo guidelines (1994) clearly position civilian 
humanitarian agencies as the primary actor for disaster response at the local, state, 
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federal, and international levels, whereas it uses the military as a most efficient tool 
equipped with resources to execute relief efforts. Therefore, the main thrust of disaster 
relief comes from civilian agencies at all tiers, while the military acts in a supportive role, 
which varies from country to country as per each state’s framework. Similarly, according 
to international norms, disaster relief is most often considered a civilian function, which 
limits the introduction of foreign military use until host nation (HN) resources are either 
exhausted or insufficient to handle the emergency situation, while the HN military is 
normally the first responder in majority of the countries. To this end, the Oslo guidelines 
(1994) provide an international practical disaster-response framework under which the 
request for foreign military aid is categorized as a final step. 
Within the disaster theater itself, the various civil humanitarian participants may 
include international and regional organizations; federal, state, and provincial or local 
agencies; non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private companies. All of these 
civil entities are over and above own and foreign militaries, even though all are working 
for a single relief operation. Civil players may also include international, regional, and 
local relief organizations, the host government, and non-government entities as 
participants in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. The increased 
number of actors in a complex emergency environment can bring much-needed resources 
but can complicate coordination or synchronization of efforts and use of resources in the 
conduct of an HADR operation.  
On one hand, the diversity of different organizations working together in a 
humanitarian effort is an asset, but on the other hand, it highlights how these participants 
are different in thinking, organizational culture, and structure. Each actor brings different 
agendas, motivations, rules of engagement, methods, terminologies, and frameworks. 
This diversity poses a great threat to an essential requirement of free flow and sharing of 
information. In such a dynamic information environment, each participant will need 
different information depending upon its organization’s objectives, on ground situation, 
and phase of the relief operation. As Larry Wentz (2006) notes, coordination and 
collaboration do take place among actors but on a highly unplanned and ad hoc basis, 
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which affects the actors’ understanding of roles, capabilities, and limitations. This 
situation hinders communication and the free flow of information sharing between 
military and civil players (Wentz, 2006).  
B. PURPOSE 
The aim of this project is to analyze the civil-military relations during HADR 
operations to understand the challenges of efficient coordination and collaboration under 
such circumstances. Results and comparisons help in formulating a framework aimed at 
enhancing coordination among participants, and ensuring a high state of readiness and 
performance in joint relief operations.  
C. SCOPE 
The research carries out an analysis of civil-military relations in HADR 
operations to improve the efficacy and coordination of resources and activities by 
focusing on selected relief operations and their respective frameworks. 
D. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
The following section explains the order in which the research is presented in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis, and then the method by which the research and analysis 
were conducted is described. 
1. Organization 
The research is composed of four main chapters. The literature review in Chapter 
II gives an overview of disasters during the last decade. It also focuses on key definitions 
of the term disaster, and identifies major actors in HADR operations. Coordination 
challenges associated by HADR operations involving multiple actors are highlighted in 
Chapter II. In addition, the research examines the organizational structure of disaster 
management systems of Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia.  
Chapter III focuses on selected HADR operations from different parts of the 
world (i.e., in Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia) with an aim to uncovering 
shortfalls in coordination between civil organizations and the military. The basis for 
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selecting these operations is the magnitude of the disasters, the number of players taking 
part in relief efforts, and the overlapping time frame of these disasters. These HADR 
operations occurred in Pakistan following an earthquake (2005), in the United States after 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), and in Indonesia after a tsunami (2004).  
In Chapter IV, we analyze the HADR operations from Chapter III to identify 
common issues of coordination in the pre, during and post operation phases of relief. The 
research also focuses on the causes of coordination failures in light of the operations’ 
respective frameworks, which resulted in delayed and poor relief response. Chapter V 
draws conclusions to the research and offers recommendations for improving 
coordination of the humanitarian community and the military during future relief efforts.  
2. Methodology 
To conduct this research, we employed a historical/archival method supported by 
inductive reasoning. A literature review serves as the primary means to identify the 
critical inter-organizational relationship and coordination issues encountered in civil-
military joint HADR missions. Further, the study focuses on joint operations conducted 
by HNs, the UN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
NGOs with militaries in recent past. The identified problem areas are then be analyzed 
against the respective organizational frameworks and doctrines to understand the reasons 
for evident shortfalls. Identified issues are then evaluated in terms of the three 
aforementioned major joint HADR operations to draw conclusions about how these 
issues were managed by the respective agencies conducting these operations. The 
research is supported by interviews on the subject with professionals who participated in 
all phases of the various HADR operations, as well as with the heads of institutions and 
specialized academic personnel. In the final chapter, we also recommend measures to 
enhance collaboration and coordination among civil and military partners to achieve a 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND ON DISASTERS AND RELIEF EFFORTS 
Since the start of the 21st century, the frequency of natural disasters has remained 
high, affecting masses all over the world. According to AccuWeather, an average of 78 
natural disasters was reported in 1970; in 2004, that number rose to 348, thereby 
increasing the number of people affected by these disasters to 217 million per year since 
1990. Disasters related to climate rose 80 percent between 1980 and 2009. The total 
financial loss due to the surge in natural disasters from 1981 to 1990 was $528 billion, 
and by 2009, it rose to $1.2 trillion  (Anderson, 2013). Since 2000, major disasters include 
Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan (2013) in the Philippines, Hurricanes Katrina (2005) Hurricane 
Sandy (2012), and Irene (2011) in the United States, the earthquake in Pakistan (2005), 
and tsunamis (2004) and earthquakes that plagued Japan and other countries, and many 
more. Scientists have concluded that the increase in climatic disasters is due to global 
warming, as well as other natural and man-made factors (Borgen, n.d.). Some sources 
further highlight how global warming has contributed to rising temperatures, resulting in 
storms and severe weather conditions. Another cause of the increase in flash and coastal 
flooding can be traced to new trends in urbanization (Borgen, n.d.).  
Table 1 shows, number of  major natural disasters and the people affected, and 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of data (which at least affected more than 
10,000 people in each occurrence): 
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  Disasters Record from 2004 to 2016. Source: CRED International Table 1.  
Disaster Database (n.d.).  
Year Number of 
Disasters 
Total Deaths Total Injured Total Affected 
2004 226 241,461 79,885 136,769,294
2005 185 87,580 148,552 80,494,987
2006 228 25,717 167,030 91,926,788
2007 146 16,562 61,425 189,771,925
2008 157 237,129 392,346 83,256,739
2009 123 8,989 11,808 104,690,847
2010 142 266,865 609,559 194,853,602
2011 134 29,538 20,600 167,141,783
2012 101 4,836 9,305 71,836,829
2013 117 16,569 41,107 74,586,958
2014 73 15,530 70,567 36,967,052
2015 93 15,081 118,946 37,515,661
2016 64 2,786 203 10437665




Figure 1.  Natural Disasters in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2004–2016. Source: 
CRED International Disaster Database (n.d.).  
Disasters have no boundaries; they have struck all across the globe. The numberof 
the natural disasters, though, is high in the Asian Pacific region (Moroney, Pezard, 
Miller, Engstrom, & Doll, 2013). This same phenomenon is mirrored in the data shown in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Major Disasters by Continent, 2004–2016. Source: CRED 
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Figure 2 clearly indicates that maximum causalities occurred in Asia during the 
period under review (2004–2016). The paper thus focuses on selected disasters in Asia 
and in the United States with an aim to determine a correlation between distinct cultures 
and their respective response mechanisms as well as of the civil-military coordination in 
those mechanisms. To understand the relief effort in the right perspective, first, we have 
to understand the correct meaning of relevant terminologies. 
1. Definitions of Disaster 
The term disaster has been defined distinctly by different organizations and 
people in light of their organizational objectives and scope. The U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) requires the president’s authority to determine the need 
for federal supplemental aid and uses a statutory definition from the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 2016 (also called the Stafford Act). 
Pointing to the Stafford Act, the U.S. Congress defines a major disaster as: 
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of 
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, 
which, in the determination of the President, causes damage of sufficient 
severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the 
Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, 
local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the 
damage, loss, hardship or suffering caused thereby. (Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 2016)  
FEMA explains the criteria in deciding an entity’s eligibility to receive federal aid 
and what amount of federal assistance an entity can expect in disaster relief as per the 
FEMA framework. The relevant clause is reproduced in Appendix A. 
2. Complex Emergencies 
The UN classifies disasters as complex emergencies and defines the term as “a 
humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or 
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ongoing UN country program” (UN, 2003). Participants who respond to such 
emergencies have distinctive roles as indicated by International Humanitarian Law. 
Militaries, for example, continue to protect victims and facilitate civil agencies in relief 
activities.  
3. Disaster Classification 
In defining the term disaster, FEMA concentrates on only the outcome of an 
event; FEMA does not consider on the nature of the event itself. By contrast, Luk N. Van 
Wassenhove (2006) classifies disasters according to their speed (slow versus sudden 
onset) and their source (natural versus man-made) (Wassenhove, 2006)This information 
enables actors not only to classify the occurrence but to planning a response accordingly. 
Figure 3 shows Wassenhove’s (2006) categorization of disasters by sudden and slow 
onsets and natural versus man-made causes. 
 
Figure 3.  Categorizing Disasters. Source: Wassenhove (2006). 
To classify a disaster within the appropriate quadrant, it is important to 
understand the disaster’s cause(s), which may not be explicitly visible or traceable 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2009). The natural cause of a flood could be excessive rain; however, 
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the man-made element comes in when as a result of an earthquake, a dam constructed on 
a tectonic fault line breaks. This represents a major challenge in humanitarian logistics. 
Although man-made causes of disasters can be neutralized, which ultimately may restrict 
the extent and magnitude of destruction caused by a natural disaster, the effort to 
neutralize this factor alters the focus of a relief operation (Kovács & Spens, 2009). We 
can conclude that the whole of the relief effort, including the resources needed and the 
involvement of major actors, hinges on all the factors discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs and necessitates detailed planning and coordination before, during, and after 
operations. 
4. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
The literature agrees on the broad understanding of the terms Humanitarian 
Assistance (HA) and Disaster Relief (DR). These two types of disaster-response efforts 
are conducted to reduce human suffering in the short and long term. DR is denoted as the 
first response, whereas HA is the one that ensures support for an extended period of 
rehabilitation and recovery efforts (Apte, 2009). 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also defines HA and DR in Joint 
Publication 1-02 (2011) as the following: 
Humanitarian Assistance — “Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results 
of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, 
hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great 
damage to or loss of property” (p. 158).  
Foreign Disaster Relief — “Aid which is provided by U.S. military to alleviate 
the suffering of foreign disaster victims, humanitarian services and transportation; the 
provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; 
the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making 
repairs to essential services” (p. 136). 
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5. Major Response Actors 
Major actors are divided into two major categories as defined by United Nations 
guidelines: 
Humanitarian Actor — All the civilian community, whether national, local, 
governmental or otherwise, which is working in the cause of humanitarian assistance/
support and actively participating in relief efforts at any level comprises humanitarian 
actors (IASC, 2004).  
Military Actor — These are official militaries of the state working together 
under some agreement and following a hierarchical chain of command; these can be 
armed personnel or otherwise (IASC, 2004). This category also includes “UN 
peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional 
troops, or other officially organized troops” (IASC, 2004, p. 9).  
Having defined civil and military actors in HADR, we must consider the subsets 
of these two categories. According to Humaninet, participants represent the following 
organizations (Humaninet, n.d.): 
 Military forces of a country or countries cooperating together; 
 Developed-country government aid agencies; 
 UN specialized agencies; 
 Non-UN international organizations; 
 International and local NGOs; 
 Host-nation governments (national, regional, and local); 
 Volunteer, university, and faith-based teams and individuals; 
 Corporate and business sector teams and assets; and 
 Service providers and contractors. (Humaninet, as cited by Wantz, 2006) 
 
a. UN Organizations 
Leaving the military forces aside, we look at the UN system and its organizations 
first in discussing major humanitarian actors. The UN has a complex but comprehensive 
structure of organizations. Centrally, the UN organization is composed of member states 
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and include “its six principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and 
Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat” 
(Byman, Lesser, Pirnie, Benard & Waxman, 2000, p. 59). By observing the UN 
humanitarian aid operations, Byman (2000) explains, we can see that the Security 
Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat play the most important 
roles throughout a disaster response. All the humanitarian efforts are coordinated by its 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) for various agencies 
(UN, n.d.). The UN humanitarian operation begins with the appointment of a 
Humanitarian Coordinator, which is one of the UN agencies that takes the lead in 
initiating and coordinating an operation on behalf of the UN. It will also outsource the 
tasks through NGOs in the fulfillment of relief efforts. The following UN agencies work 
together as per their scope and assigned tasks: 
World Food Program (WFP) 
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
 World Health Organization (WHO) 
 UN Development Program (UNDP) 
 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
  Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). (UN, n.d.) 
The listed organizations are independent of the parent UN office with respect to 
their working and operations according to their assigned mandate (UN, n.d.).  
b. International Organizations  
Among the international organizations (IO), a Swiss institution, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the leading organization, with adequate resources, 
networks, and expertise all around the world to support relief operations for displaced 
people and disaster-affected communities. The committee has set out to uphold the 
Geneva Conventions as their framework to operate and is guided by “seven principles: 
concern for humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, 
and universality” (ICRC, n.d.). In Muslim countries, the organization is called Red 
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Crescent. Red Cross has its headquarters in Geneva and it aims for the development of 
humanitarian activities. Its societies, such as the American Red Cross, play an important 
role in providing care to the victims of natural disasters by coordinating relief operations 
while staying out of the conflict zone. The organization is focused on promoting world 
peace (Benthall, 1997). To enhance its role in other countries, it has formed an 
International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), which is subscribed with other national 
societies to coordinate relief efforts under the same framework (ICRC, n.d.). Following 
are few examples of IOs: 
 ICRC 
 IFRC 
 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, for example, the American 
Red Cross 
 SMOM (Sovereign Military Order of Malta) (Wentz, 2006) 
 
c. Inter-Governmental Organizations  
Inter-governmental organizations (IGO) are regional cooperation efforts among 
countries for common goals and interests. One of the most common driving goals for 
such cooperation is the economic benefits that each member state aims for, but other 
interests could be security, culture, politics, or shared geographic concerns (Wentz, 
2006). Such cooperation also serves the purpose of coordinating efforts in the case of a 
natural disaster. The UN is an organization that is globally focused on all its member 
states’ issues, whereas other IGOs are focused on specific regions or a common interest. 
Some IGOs are: 
 World Bank Group 
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—formally Linked to the UN 
 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
 European Union (EU) 
 European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CRICOM) 
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 Organization of American States (OAS) 
 Coordination Center for the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America 
(CEPREDENAC) 
 African Union (AU) 
 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Wentz, 2006) 
 
d. Non-Governmental Organizations  
NGOs are independent organizations, unaffiliated with governments, mostly 
working for humanitarian assistance and social uplift programs for underprivileged 
populations or working for some other positive cause. These groups have different 
functions, sizes, and scopes, ranging from local to global. Over time, NGOs have been 
able to develop reliable and trustworthy relations by which they handle and channel large 
amounts of funding from different sources to support humanitarian aid/relief efforts as 
well as other social causes (Wentz, 2006). NGOs carry out their work under the legal 
cover of the country where they are registered or are operating. They have their own 
organizational hierarchy and are accountable to the board of directors, who arrange to 
fund and prepare frameworks for NGOs. The UN does not have any jurisdiction over 
NGOs; however, the UN does play an important role in coordinating relief activities 
through these NGOs. A few prominent NGOs are: 
 Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere (CARE) 
 World Vision 
 Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières-MSF) 
 OXFAM 
 Church World Services (CWS) 
 United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) 
 Mercy Corps International (MCI) 
 International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
 Catholic Relief Service (CRS) 
 International Medical Corps (IMC) 
 Danish Relief Council (DRC) 
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 Norwegian Relief Council (NRC) 
 Save the Children 
 Alliances of NGOs: 
 InterAction (U.S.-based NGOs) 
 International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) (Wentz, 
2006) 
 
B. UNDERSTANDING CIVIL-MILITARY DYNAMICS IN HADR 
OPERATIONS   
Disaster relief operations are those special operations in which civil and military 
actors come together with a common goal to help those suffering. Those involved in 
these operations are confronted with many challenges and amongst them one is the inter 
agency relations as the outcome depends on the coordination which these civil-military 
outfits share. To better understand this we have to understand coordination and then focus 
on the civil-military relations. 
1. Definitions of Coordination 
Coordination is an important factor when two or more individuals, organizations, 
or countries join to function as one entity. In this paper, we are focusing on civil-military 
coordination in humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations. Therefore, we need to 
understand how coordination is defined by different organizations regardless of the role 
they play in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, as any such role ultimately focuses 
on alleviating suffering. As described by Balcik et al. (2009), coordination has two types: 
one is vertical coordination, and the other is horizontal coordination. In vertical 
coordination, the NGO must coordinate with sister organizations or with those who are 
over them or under them in a particular operation (i.e., an NGO coordinating for services 
with a transportation company). In horizontal coordination, one NGO coordinates with 
another NGO; that means one organization coordinates with another organization of the 
same kind (Balcik, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu, & Ramirez, 2009).  
As one would expect, coordination and collaboration are two words frequently 
used by humanitarian organizations (Russell, 2005). Collaboration is the joining together 
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for a common understanding of an idea or plan, which makes it a theoretical exchange of 
ideas or knowledge. Coordination, on the other hand, is an action for the sharing of 
information and resources by more than one organization for a common goal. Balcik, B., 
Beamon, B. M., Krejci, C. C., Muramatsu, K. M., & Ramirez, M.  (2009) reason that the 
term coordination has different meanings within the relief domain; coordination refers to 
information sharing and resources, the principle of making decisions centrally, carrying 
out coordinated operations, partition on the basis of regions, or a division of tasks; it can 
also refer to a cluster-based relief responsibility (Balcik et al., 2009). The UN and 
different relief agencies have specifically created offices such as the Office of 
Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Nations Joint Logistics 
Center (UNJLC), and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which are dedicated 
to coordination activities. Furthermore, the UN has positioned numerous programs, 
including the Central Emergency Fund (CERF) and Consolidated Appeals Process 
(CAP), with an aim of enhancing coordination among agencies providing relief (see 
Reindorp, 2002; Kehler, 2004, for more details) as cited by (Balcik et al., 2009).  
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) defines the civil-
military relationship as “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination,” and describes it as 
a system based on interactions among agencies. This relationship centers on the 
“exchange of information, negotiation, mutual support, and planning at all levels,” which 
is carried out mutually by the military component, humanitarian organizations, and 
civilians of the area, with a focus on individual organizational aims and objectives ( UN 
DPKO, 2002).  
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008) 
describes “civil-military coordination in light of a humanitarian perspective as an 
essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian 
emergencies which are necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, to 
avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and when appropriate to pursue common 
goals.” (UNOCHA, 2008, p.8) It also terms coordination to be a responsibility commonly 
shared and ensured by joint training, and effective liaison between aid organizations and 
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the military. Coordination requires both components to work in a joint team, to ensure 
joint integrated plans, to establish common goals, and to be accommodating. For this type 
of interagency coordination, the UNOCHA uses the acronym “CM Coord” (UNOCHA, 
200), as cited by (Balcik et al., 2009).  
The United States Civil Affairs (CA) doctrine addresses cooperation and 
coordination between civil and military organizations while U.S. Joint Doctrine mentions 
cooperation instead of coordination. The latter emphasizes activities to develop a 
relationship between organizations by focusing on measures like joint training, more 
detailed measures for interactions and communication, and honoring diversity in the 
organizational culture (African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
[ACCORD], 2005; Joint Publication [JP], 2003; Pollick, 2000) as cited by (Balcik et al., 
2009). 
Francis Kofi Abiew (2003) describes coordination as a “measure to achieve a 
comprehensive approach based on complementary capabilities” (Abiew, 2003, p. 33). 
Citing Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Abiew (2003) suggests that the civil-military relationship is 
a blend of effective and efficient inter-organizational partnerships of the military with aid 
organizations, in which mutual respect is an important component, and it is enhanced by 
mutual trust rather than dependence on command (Jakobsen, 2000. p. 42). 
2. Civil-Military Coordination in HADR Operations 
The civil-military relationship is complex, and it gets more pronounced when 
these organizations come together during humanitarian operations. The military plays 
multiple roles in executing its duty, including before, during, and after disasters. Wentz 
(2006) believes that military and civilian organizations are different from one another on 
the basis of their functionality and their distinct organizational base. The military, on one 
hand, has only one commander to whom all personnel report. On the other hand, civil 
organizations have more autonomous units, such as transport, supply, administrative and 
public information; this results in coordination problems in the field and invites friction 
(Wentz, 2006).  
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Normally after a disaster, no single authority controls the relief effort, so we can 
say it is a less regulated or unregulated effort (Stephenson, 2005). Balcik (2010) claims 
that the governments of the affected countries (host countries) shoulder the overall 
responsibility for relief operations inside their countries, and all participating members or 
organizations are duty bound to adhere to the laws of the host country (Balcik, 2010, p. 
23). Working in harmony is required to ensure better results. If the civil organizations and 
the military involved in humanitarian aid are working in an uncoordinated way, they will 
be undermining each other. All stakeholders have to understand and accept each other’s 
differences and move forward by joint planning, communication, and the equal 
distribution of roles and responsibility to ensure an adequate response to the crisis. 
Flexibility on both sides is required to understand one another, and training is the key 
method to promote this understanding (Abiew, 2003). 
In terms of resources available to prevent, manage, and respond to disasters, every 
nation has its own safeguards and level of preparation. The U.S. DOD has some of the 
most modern assets, which include air and sealift aircraft to transport personnel and 
humanitarian supplies. It also has the most detailed distribution and supply chain, with 
state-of-the-art logistic capabilities, handled by some of the most professional logisticians 
who are trained in disaster relief, with a focus on all phases of operations management. 
They have a detailed setup of engineering, communication, and medical support bases, 
which can support military and non-military alike (Moroney, Pezard, Miller, Engstrom, 
& Doll, 2013). To ensure the success of a HADR operation, it is a must to have a high 
degree of preparedness and performance at critical times.  
Civil-military coordination also plays a critical role in any HADR missions for a 
number of reasons. It speeds up the response and recovery process by utilizing the most 
appropriate and efficient assets to achieve the best results. This capability ensures the far 
reach of relief personnel deep into remote locations by making the best use of available 
road infrastructures or, if denied access on the ground, by helicopters. This detailed 
coordination prevents duplication of effort and saves lives and resources (Martin, n.d., p. 
2): “Finally, it promotes the timely flow of information from the host nation government 
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down to assisting state units, agencies, and ultimately, to the people in the different 
communities.”  
Due to this close interaction between military and humanitarian organizations, 
many initiatives have been observed to enhance mutual coordination. A step in the same 
direction is the UN Civil-Military Cooperation Centers, which are aimed at enhancing the 
coordination effort between the military and civil organizations, including the UN 
agencies, during joint operations. Liaison officers (LOs) are also employed in the field 
with civilian organizations and NGOs to ensure the flow of information and coordination 
during relief efforts (Abiew, 2003). It has helped in building relations and coordination 
between various groups, and the same concept can also be taken a step further (Abiew, 
20003, p. 35). By focusing on these points, we can judge that the main aim of all 
organizations is to reach out to those who are affected and to save lives. To ensure this, 
we have to understand the organizational structure of not only military but civilian 
organizations, which include government and non-government organizations.  
a. Culture of Civil Organizations and the  Relief Community  
To ensure better understanding and cooperation between civil and military 
organizations, both sides need to understand each other’s culture. As a RAND report 
(2000) states, “The actors vary tremendously in their capabilities, size, and attitudes, with 
considerable implications for cooperation with the U.S. military and success of the 
overall relief effort. Major actors include the United Nations family, the Red Cross, Red 
Crescent Movement, and NGOs” (Byman, Lesser, Pirnie, Benard, & Waxman, 2000, p. 
59). Understanding the inner culture and functioning of these organizations is very 
important for a successful operation.  
Each organization has its own culture, its own values, and its own distinct 
functioning, with a common aim of providing comfort to those who are affected in times 
of need. Wentz (2006) admits that civilian relief organizations have a distinct 
organizational culture and structure. Nevertheless, they do not believe in formality or the 
use of authority, and they are less conscious of security and traditions. Typically, NGOs 
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are headed by an executive officer, who acts as a country manager/director, in charge of 
the mission; under him normally is a project manager, administration staff, and security 
offices. Due to this flatter structure, NGOs enjoy greater flexibility and autonomy as 
compared to the military (Wentz, 2006). 
The fact that humanitarian organizations have a culturethat is distinct from that of 
the military contributes to the need for effective coordination in the field whenever these 
organizations come in contact in either a supporting or leadship role. Abiew (2003) 
highlights that NGOs are distinct in in terms of their size, mandate, capacity, and 
professionalism, and all NGOs specialize according to their own capabilities (Abiew, 
2003). Due to the increasing involvement of militaries and NGOs in relief operations, 
many times they have had overlapping roles. Such poor management of resources and 
responsibilities can occur when sharing of information and operational objectives is not 
coordinated properly.  
b. Military Organizations and Their Culture 
Military culture is one of oldest in history, and it has evolved over time. Military 
organizations have particular traditions and ways of working, which reflect their 
geographic regions and local cultures. Military culture is a rich mixture, influenced by 
history, values, history, geography, people, military campaigns, and the impact of the 
ruling elite (Murray, 1999, p. 29). In turn, military culture reflectshow a nation as a whole 
performs. In the words of Williamson Murray, “Military culture is the reflection of the 
ethos, professional attributes, both in terms of experience and intellectual study” (Murray, 
1999, p. 28). Different military components and organizations have developed over time, 
often keeping pace with technological advancement. The basic military branches include 
the army, the navy, and the air force. Each arm of the military has its own sub-branches, 
but in this paper, we refer to all of them as the military. To study civil-military relations 
and their coordination shortfalls, we must begin by focusing on the military role in the 
disaster relief efforts. In particular, we use the example of the United States armed forces, 
which are the most modern military. The United States military first participated in a 
disaster relief operation after the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. During this relief 
 21
effort, the soldiers of the Pacific Division were joined by the National Guard, Navy, and 
Marines, and the University of California’s Cadet Corps also took an active part 
(Bronson, 1959, as cited in Gaydos and Luz, 1994, p. 49). U.S. forces have not only 
participated as the lead support organization within the United States but internationally 
also. Joel C. Gaydos and George A. Luz (1994) cite Coultrip (1974) and  Byrd (1980) 
who mention the earthquake in Nicaragua in 1972, the famous cyclone of 1978 at Sri 
Lanka, and the Iraqi refugee crisis after Operation Desert Storm in Gulf War, in which 
the military participated in the distribution of food and tents. Furthermore, the U.S. armed 
forces assisted in the provision of the most critical resource, water, and in ensuring 
cleanliness at refugee facilities (Centers for Disease Control, 1991, as cited in Gaydos & 
Luz, 1994). Gaydos and Luz note the following conditions as critical in the decision to 
make use of the United States military in disaster-related operations: 
 Close availability of the military to the disaster area is often ensured because 
of the military’s dispersion and operational areas of responsibility. 
 The concept of ‘citizen-soldier’ and the availability of the reserves and 
National Guard soldiers in the general vicinity and their being accepted by 
local communities make the military a good choice to conduct relief efforts.  
 The nuclear threat within the United States had already led  to military 
disaster relief/response planning since 1950 (Gleason, 1957; Hammarlund, 
1957; Reese et al., 1962, as cited in Gaydos & Luz, 1994).  
 The specialized capabilities, such as training, coupled with modern equipment 
and a large and well-trained workforce make the military best suited to 
participate in relief operations.  
 Detailed and thorough military planning, including the contingency planning, 
can facilitate efficient and effective HADR activities.  
Like civilian relief organizations, the military has its own distinct organizational 
structure coupled with a rich culture, which makes it effective not only in traditional 
operations in the field but also in relief operations. At the same time, this structure and 
inherent culture frustrate civilian relief organizations who think the military is inflexible. 
Wentz (2006) describes military organizations as highly structured and hierarchical, with 
a chain of command focused on achieving the mission assigned, bounded by rules, and 
well laid out regulations, which works according to a detailed and well laid out process, 
steered by a “work hard, play hard” ethic. Furthermore, it is an organization based on 
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competitiveness, rich traditions, high psychological stress sustainability, which greatly 
respects experience, seniority, and age. The military is an organization trained on an idea 
of combat readiness, battle skills, physical fitness, equipment maintenance, and 
battlefield survival, which is also secretive of operational security. Larry Wentz (2006) 
points out that the military is an organization whose officers are most assertive, decisive, 
tenacious, and confident and are trained on the principle of “make a decision and make it 
now” (Wentz, 2006, p. 25).  
c. Military Aid to Civilian Authorities 
Paul Salmon, Neville Stanton, Dan Genkins & Guy Walker (2011) asserts that 
military aid to civilian authorities in the United States is a special circumstance in which 
the military works with humanitarian organizations in response to large emergencies 
within a country. When military support is required, the civil organizations or authorities 
can request support through the U.S. Department of Defense in the form of military aid to 
civil authorities. Military participation in relief operations, however, must be the only 
remaining option. The governing criteria for approving such a request are identified by 
Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins, & Walker (2011, p. 141) as the following: 
 All private agencies have been found not compatible with the task at hand, or 
they lack the resources to take it on.  
 The civilian apparatus is lacking the capability or the necessary apparatus is 
too expensive for the civilian agencies to develop one.  
 The need to act is urgent, and although the civil authority has the capability, 
the authority cannot implement the capability quickly enough.  
A major part in any of the disaster is played by the NGOs, which are normally 
part of relief efforts following a disaster (Gaydos & Luz, 1994, p. 54). Gaydos & Luz, 
while explaining the NGO and military relationship and partnership, mentions the 
questions that need to be answered for an NGO before it works with the military. These 
questions include who initiates a request for military support in the relief effort following 
a disaster? Who directs the military? How is the military activity supervised? Who pays 
for the military support effort? Can the military’s involvement damage the post-disaster 
recovery outcomes? (Walker, 1992, p. 158, as cited in Gaydos & Luz, 1994, p. 54): 
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Whenever the United States military has to join a disaster relief effort overseas, it 
is on the orders of the U.S. State Department. Moreover, the State Department issues 
orders to the military only after receipt of an invitation from the country affected by the 
disaster. Gaydos also explains that military personnel are given a defined duration for 
their duty, along with specific support limitations, which are provided by military 
leadership (Gaydos & Luz, 1994, p. 55). 
3. Challenges Faced in Disasters and Problem Areas  
As stated in Joint Publication 3–29, “obstacles to unified action include differing 
objectives and modes of operation, competing missions, inadequate structure and 
procedures, incompatible communications, overly restrictive security classifications, 
cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014, pp. 1–2). Some of these obstacles are evidenced by NGOs, who believe that 
sharing information with the military undermines their credibility in the eyes of the local 
population and makes their task difficult in the field. While describing this phenomenon, 
Gielie Van Dyk (2007) argues that humanitarian agencies perform their duties in 
accordance with guiding principles of “humanity, neutrality, and impartiality”; 
compromising these principles is a primary barrier that limits coordination among NGOs 
and the military (Van Dyk, 2007, p. 85). Civilian organizations give higher priority to 
their image of impartiality and independence; thus, they avoid the association with the 
military (Wentz, 2006). 
a. Challenges in Disasters 
The challenges to be faced in natural and manmade disasters are frequently 
similar. Howard Davis (2017) in his article “Organizational Challenges in the United 
Kingdom’s Post-disaster Crisis Support Work” explains these challenges in detail. He 
explains that irrespective of the degree of preparation and organizational flexibility, 
responders have to face multiple challenges. Davis highlights that location and scale of 
the incident is one of the primary challenges, which is more pronounced depending on 
the magnitude of the disaster. While explaining secondary challenges, Davis mentions the 
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importance of the flow of information, coordination among agencies, and detailed 
planning (Davis, 2017).  
b. Problem Areas 
A review of the current literature on the subject of disaster relief reveals that 
interagency coordination during disasters is wanting (Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins, & 
Walker, 2011, p. 141, cited in Banipal, 2006; McEntire, 2008; Smith & Dowell, 2000). 
Abiew explains that coordination problems are due to improvement measures made on ad 
hoc basis and taken at the grassroots level. Often  such measures are guided by or are the 
result of individual experiences of the workers in the field (Abiew, 2003). Further, it has 
been found that the humanitarian agencies are widely diverse in their culture and 
structure when compared to the set pattern and well organized and well trained 
hierarchical military chain of command (Lloyd & Van Dyk, 2007, p. 77). Whenever there 
is a disaster and the relief effort is mobilized by pre-designated teams, with or without the 
help of the military, the response is organized and managed at multiple tiers, operational, 
tactical, and strategical (UK Ministry of Defense, 2007a, as cited by Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins & Walker 2011, p. 142). Once a natural disaster strikes the operational command 
is activated, and it is normally the one located at the incident site, which according to 
British doctrine is called Bronze command level (Salmon et al. 2011, p. 142). In this tier, 
local resources are used along with pre-located supplies in the affected area. This is 
normally the first tier, and operational command goes beyond this level if the magnitude 
of the disaster and related relief effort is larger. The next tier, as per British doctrine, is 
Silver level command, and it determines the priorities for the distribution or allocation of 
resources. At the same time, it assesses risks and plans and coordinates the response. It 
also analyzes the situation, demands additional resources, and if, beyond its capability, it 
involves the strategic level of command (Salmon et al., 2011, p. 142). In case the 
magnitude of the incident is greater than what the tactical level can handle or if there are 
multiple incidents, then the level of response is raised to the strategic (Gold) level of 
command. At this level, the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG), which is a multi-
agency group, is utilized. It encompasses all commanders from all lead organizations 
involved in the relief effort. So it becomes the responsibility of SCG to take over 
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command of the relief effort (Salmon et al., 2011, p. 142). According to the UK Ministry 
of Defense (2007a), as cited by Salmon’s (2011) article, the SCG will ensure the 
following: 
 The determination and dissemination of, as well as continuously updating, 
clear strategic aims and objectives. 
 The preparation and execution of a policy framework for managing the 
incident. 
 Prioritization of the demands at the Silver level and ensuring the provision of 
resources and personnel to meet requirements.  
 Development and implementation of a media campaign and ensureing 
efficient plans for public communication. 
 Ensuring efficient recovery by directing plans and operations focused on the 
response, which is beyond the immediate zone.  
c. Problems Identified in UK Ministry of Defense Study 
Several problem areas were discovered during our analysis of coordination 
challenges between civil-military organizations. Our research focuses on identifying the 
obstructions in the process and provides guidance to address them by drawing on 
observations from previous studies by experts (Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011, p. 141). Table 2 lists the problem areas identified (Salmon, 2011, p. 153). 
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 Factors Limiting Coordination. Adapted from Salmon, Stanton, Table 2.  
Jenkins, and Walker (2011).  
Factor Problem 
1. Organizational - Lack of clear and effective leadership 
- Unclear command and control structure 
- Inadequate or inappropriate command and 
control structure 
- Lack of clarity regarding each agency’s 
roles and responsibilities 
- Inadequate multi-agency response 
frameworks or procedures 
- Conflicting goals 
 
2. Information Management 
 
- Poor information management 
- Lack of an appropriate common 
operational picture 
- Lack of clarity regarding Military Aid to 




- Lack of communication 
- Communication of inaccurate or 
incomplete information 
- Lack of clear communication links 
between agencies 
- Lack of a common communication 
structure 
 
4.  Situation Awareness 
 
- Inadequate levels of distributed situation 
awareness 
- Inadequate levels of meta-situation 
awareness 
- Lack of understanding of each agency’s 
roles and responsibilities 
- Lack of understanding of each agency’s 
capability and resources 





- Inadequate communication technology 
- Incompatible communications technology 




6. Cultural Issues 
 
- Incompatible procedures 
- Lack of understanding of military 
concepts, processes, and procedures 
- Lack of understanding of civilian 




- Lack of multi-agency training exercises 




d. Additional Inter-organizational Challenges 
Some additional challenges include different agencies that have their own 
priorities, procedures, cultures, knowledge base, resources, and technologies. In a time of 
aid, when one member during the relief operation disappears another appears, and that 
member might not have been part of the emergency preparation (Davis, 2011). The 
authors of this thesis assert that, in comparison to NGOs present since the initial stage of 
a disaster relief operation, the military or additional NGOs joining at a later stage can 
cause multiple coordination problems. A mechanism is needed to integrate these 
organizations after requisite briefings and training. 
In addition, there is a need for a systematic evacuation and support mechanism for 
the casualties during the relief operation, in which the phase-wise responsibilities are 
centrally distributed and coordinated to ensure proper care of the victims. In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, for example, rescued people were left on highways and in some cases 
without food or shelter. Furthermore, some areas were searched multiple times, while 
others remained unattended, then victims were shifted to  other locations without mutual 
communication amongst organizations  (Franke, Charoy, & Khoury, 2013, p. 34, as cited 
by Davis, 2011). Shifting goals of organizations can result in deviation from planned 
relief efforts. For example, the initial plan may be to protect a residential area, but as the 
disaster situation worsens, the goal might shift from protection to evacuation (Franke, 
 28
2013, p. 35). This will result in the need for better and more detailed coordination in 
which this shift and the modification of plans should be discussed as the contingency 
model to ensure a smooth transition.  
In terms of communication, the humanitarian community shares information 
related to the situation on the ground pertaining to the sufferings of civilians. 
Humanitarian organizations communicate effectively among themselves, but avoid 
sharing information with the military. Often such organizations fear that the military 
gathers information beyond its immediate scope, which affects the operation of the 
humanitarian organizations and is not of value for the relief operation itself (Abiew, 
2003).  
According to Van Dyk (2007) coordination is also hindered by the distinct 
organizational cultures and their approach to authority and decision making styles in the 
military and civil sector. “The military decision making is based on a hierarchical top-
down approach with clear deadlines and rules of engagement that guide all parts of the 
structure from senior leadership to the soldiers on the ground” (Van Dyk, 2007, p. 86). 
Wentz (2006) states that, in the post-disaster reconstruction phase, long-term focus is not 
the priority of the military, which aims at speedy results; it has little or no training in 
developmental work and faces difficulty in coordinating with civilian elements (Larry 
Wentz  2006). 
Following a disaster, NGOs work to acquire the funds to help those in need, and 
they are among the first ones to react, after the local agencies. If they are located in the 
area affected, sometimes NGOs are the main source of support and information for all 
those coming after them. Donors are the ones with the money, but they are not duty 
bound to fund any disaster operation (Seaman, 1999). Relief organizations have to work 
for the satisfaction of the donors to ensure that the flow of money continues to ensure 
projects on the ground. Most of the relief organizations bank on the donors’ money and 
are unable to provide disaster assistance prior to the funds’ availability, according to 
Seaman (1999), as cited by Balcik et al. (2010, p. 23). NGOs normally plan beforehand 
but in the case of natural disasters, they can only react once the funds are available to 
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them to support the relief plan (Balcik et al., 2010). Randolph C. Kent, while explaining 
the same dilemma linking funds with coordination, states that a funds race is common 
among the organizations taking part in relief operations; this competition can affect not 
only the relief operation but also coordination during the relief effort (Kent, 2004).  
Media also plays its role as it keeps a close eye on the relief efforts and on the 
ground performance of different stakeholders in the field. NGOs want to get more funds 
from the donors and the media reports play a critical role in NGOs ability to attract more 
funding. Media sometimes can exert pressure on relief organizations, which can make 
them work contrary to their core ideas and beliefs (Seaman, 1999).  
The size of the organization also affects coordination. Small NGOs are unable to 
spare individuals to act as liaison officers), nor can they afford much overhead, which 
consumes funds at the cost of human lives in the field. As a result, NGOs want to have 
minimal staff to harness this overhead cost. Due to the limited resource capacity, the 
smaller relief organizations cannot allow their limited number of workers providing relief 
in the field to attend coordination meetings (Moore et al., 2003). This contributes to a 
lack of coordination.  
Means of transportation and the availability of vehicles is another major problem. 
It can get more pronounced if an entire country or a larger region is affected. The lack of 
transportation also affects the prices and means of communication to and out of those 
areas. Balcik, Beamon, Krejci, Muramatsu & Ramirez (2010) highlights that, Disaster 
relief environments can also be hostile, which can necessitate the implementation of 
security measures or movement in convoys (Balcik et al., 2010, p. 25). In such cases, 
NGOs must depend on the host country’s military for security and economization of 
effort. This coordination and functioning with the military poses great challenges. These 
challenges can only be addressed by close mutual coordination. Sharing of transportation 
also increases bargaining power in relief operations (Balcik et al., 2010). NGOs depend 
largely on the military for coordinating horizontally for airlifts, sharing of warehouses nd 
storage facilities, logistic assets, information sharing and security (Balcik et al., 2010). 
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According to Wentz (2006), diverse logistical support networks also pose a 
difficulty in field operations. In most cases, civilian relief organizations do not have 
standby funds and must heavily depend on donors and other fund source, which results in 
delayed or interrupted supplies. The staff in the field are the ones who must make 
decisions appropriate for the situation, and they do not have a single point command and 
control authority. Moreover, NGO leaders normally receive the decision-making 
authority at a much younger age as compared to military decision makers. This cultural 
gap has a great impact and heightens the cultural differences between civilian and 
military organizations (Wentz, 2006). 
Table 3 summarizes the problems highlighted by different authors, who have been 
cited in the preceding paragraphs. This will lead us to look into three selected operations 
in next chapters where we will see if same problems / challenges were encountered 
during those operations. 
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 Summary of Major Problem Areas  Table 3.  
Problem Areas Author Citation Remarks 
Framework 




(Bollen, 2008)  







& Ramirez, 2009) 
 





Russell and Balcik 
et al. 
(Russell, 2005) 
(Balcik et al., 2009) 
Balcik et al. claim 
that coordination is 
different from 
collaboration 
- UN bodies, such as 
UNOCHA, UNJLC, 
IASC, CERF, and 
CAP, work for 
interagency 
coordination 
- Reindorp, Kehler 





- (Reindorp, 2002; 
Kehler, 2004,  
cited by Balcik et 
al., 2009 
Policy failure - Davis 
- Birkland 
- (Davis, 2016 
&2017) 




- Inadequate response 
framework 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker 
(Salmon, Stanton, 




- Lack of joint 
training 
ACCORD, JP 2003, 




(JP) 2003);  
(Pollick, 2000); and 
(Balcik et al. 2009) 
 
- Joint Plans -ACCORD, JP, 
2003, Pollick, and 
Balcik et al. 
- Abiew 
-ACCORD 2005, 
(JP, 2003); (Pollick, 
2000); and (Balcik 
et al. 2009) 
- (Abiew, 2003). 
 
- Absence of plan or 
too big aPlan 
- Davis 
- Gaydos and Luz  
- (Davis, 2016) 
- (Gaydos & Luz, 
1994) 
 
- Joint teams ACCORD, JP 2003, 
Pollick & Balcik et 
al. 
ACCORD 2005, (JP 
2003); (Pollick, 
2000); and (Balcik 
et al., 2009) 
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Abiew (Abiew, 2003)  
- Lack of multi-
agency training 
exercise 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins & Walker 
 
(Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) 
 
Inter Organizational Culture 














- (Davis, 2016) 
 
- Military has strict 
command channel  
- Wentz 
- Lloyd & Van Dyk 
- (Wentz, 2006) 
- (Lloyd & Van 
Dyk, 2007) 
 
- Unclear command 
and control structure 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, and Walker
- (Salmon, Stanton, 






Wentz (Wentz, 2006)  
- Military is more 
authoritative 
Wentz (Wentz, 2006)  
- NGOs are more 
flexible and 
autonomous 
Wentz (Wentz, 2006)  





- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, and Walker 
 
(Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins & Walker, 
2011) 
 
- NGOs’ reluctance 
to share Information 
- Abiew (Abiew, 2003)  
- NGOs give higher 
priority to their 
image, independence 
and impartiality 
Wentz (Wentz, 2006, p. 
27) 
 
- Spirit of 
competition among 
Relief agencies 
Kent  (Kent, 2004)  
- Lack of attendance 
at meetings 
Moore (Moore et al., 2003)  
Problems Due to Nature of HADR Operations
- Multiple authorities Stephenson (Stephenson, 2005)  
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Problem Areas Author Citation Remarks 
controlling the relief 
effort 
- Host nation (HN) as 
final authority 
Balcik (Balcik et al., 2010, 
p. 23) 
 
- Equal distribution 
of roles 
Abiew (Abiew, 2003).  
- Asia is more prone 
















- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, and 
Walker 
- (Abiew, 2003) 
- (Martin, n.d., p. 2) 
- (Davis, 2016) 
- (Salmon, Stanton, 







- (Davis, 2016)  
- Distribution of 
responsibility 
Abiew (Abiew, 2003).  
- Duplication of 
effort 
Martin (Martin, n.d., p. 2)  
- Smooth flow of 
relief 
Martin (Martin, n.d., p. 2)  
- Inter-agency 
coordination 
- Salmon, Stanton, 




- (Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) 
 
- (Abiew, 2003) 
Cited by Banipal, 
2006; McEntire, 
2008; Smith and 
Dowell, 2000 
- Lack of clarity of 
roles and 
responsibilities 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, and Walker 
 
(Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) 
 
- Lack of common 
operational picture 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, and Walker 
 
(Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) 
 
- Knowledge of inter-
organizational 
capabilities and roles 
- Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker 
 
(Salmon, Stanton, 
Jenkins, & Walker, 
2011) 
 
- Lack of systematic 
evacuation of 
casualties  
Frank, Charoy, & 
Khoury 
(Franke, Charoy, & 
Khoury, 2012, p. 
34, as cited in 
Davis, 2011) 
Cited by Davis 
- Shifting goals of Franke (Franke et al., 2012,  
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Problem Areas Author Citation Remarks 
organizations p. 35) 





III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. HADR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR FRAMEWORKS 
To understand the relief process, we have to focus on the major organizations and 
their frameworks. It will help us in seeing it in connection with the problem areas which 
we have already talked about.  
1. Government Organizations 
Every country has its own government body to respond to disasters or to oversee 
disaster relief efforts. These organizations are distinct and vary from one another 
according to the culture and needs of their respective countries. Disaster management 
authority has a significant role in its effort to provide assistance in HADR operations. It 
regulates the relief process by focusing on the preparation, implementation, and follow-
up phases of the process. In the United States, this authority is the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), which is authority component of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and the first responder in the case of a domestic disaster (FEMA, 
2014). For Pakistan, it is the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), which 
aims to manage disasters from the local level up to the national level and by enhancing 
the capabilities of all components in disaster relief at each tier (NDMA, 2015). Similarly, 
Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana [BNPB]) is responsible for relief and recovery following any disaster in the 
country and ensures the organization of a comprehensive relief effort (BNPB, 2015). In 
the following sections, we examine each country’s framework to understand the 
organizational structure of their respective authorities with an aim to study selected 
operations later in the chapter.  
2. National Disaster Response Management in the United States of 
America  
After the 9/11 attacks in the United States, all the federal agencies were brought 
under a newly established federal agency, i.e., the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), with the aim to coordinate and provide a joint response to domestic emergencies 
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(DHS, 2014). According to the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the 
Department of Homeland Security has five fundamental security policies to protect the 
country from threats and hazards, such as promoting security to stop terrorism, increasing 
security at the borders, implementing immigration law, protecting cyberspace, and 
promoting national preparedness for disasters (DHS, 2014). FEMA is an integrated part 
of the National Preparedness System, which is responsible for disaster management 
within the country working under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security. 
As per the National Response Framework (NRF), the U.S. disaster management 
system establishes the basic guidelines for disaster response and focuses on implementing 
the scalable-flexible-adaptable operational capabilities” (p. 5) harmonizing an effort 
through unified command, and organizing the response (DHS, 2013). The guidelines are 
formulated based on the historical experience gained in emergency response and provide 
a framework for disaster response. The framework encompasses the organizational 
structure from the local to the federal levels. Figure 4 shows the organizational structure 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FEMA as the leading authority in 
disaster management.  
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Figure 4.  FEMA at Center of U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Organization Chart. Adapted from Department of Homeland  
Security (n.d.) 
a. The Federal Government 
FEMA is the primary responder to any incident of national significance, and as 
such, FEMA’s objective is to support local and state governments within the country by 
working together with other actors (FEMA, 2014). The agency focuses on enhancing 
capabilities, coordinating relief activities, and planning a joint response. The authority’s 
priority is supporting the affected citizens before, during, and in the aftermath of a 
disaster with effective and efficient strategies (FEMA, 2014). FEMA works together with 
inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, and DOD to increase the readiness in a disaster 
operation. An important role of FEMA is to enhance coordination by sharing information 
among all the key players thereby managing disaster risks and reaching well-informed 
decisions to formulate a joint response (FEMA, 2014). The organization chart provided in 




Figure 5.  U.S Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Organizational Chart. 
Source: FEMA (2017). 
b. States Governments 
During the disaster relief response a major role is played by the state 
governments, which are adequately equipped with resources at their direct disposal. 
These includes “state emergency management and homeland security agencies, state 
police, health agencies, transportation agencies, incident management teams, specialized 
teams, and the National Guard” (FEMA, n.d.). According to FEMA, the state 
governments play a lead role in coordinating relief operations at the state level, utilizing 
own resources, and if need be, approaching the federal agency to support an operation, 
according to the terms of the Stafford Act. The detailed mandate of a state government in 
disaster management is given in Appendix B (FEMA, n.d.). 
c. Local Governments 
Local governments, comprising the lowest tier of an emergency response, directly 
engage in relief activities with limited capabilities and resources. Local governments 
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have better knowledge of their communities and local infrastructure, and thus can provide 
vital information to organize joint relief operations. In addition, according to the 
responsibility and role of the local governments, they are the last authority to leave a 
disaster location. Their mandate includes establishing a relationship with local 
communities and the private sector, as well as developing capacity and a framework to 
mitigate challenges and reduce friction during the contingency situation (FEMA, n.d.). 
The detailed responsibilities of local governments are given in Appendix B. 
d. Framework 
Soon after the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, a national 
framework was formulated as the National Response Plan (NRP) 2004, which was 
approved by Congress. The NRP provides general guidelines and procedures for federal 
support components reacting to domestic emergencies. The NRP is an outcome of 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), which highlights an approach for the national 
preparedness system that recognizes and measures risks, provides up-to-date situational 
awareness, and monitors the consequences and effects on the community (FEMA, 2011). 
The framework also focuses on capabilities assessment and its enhancement to promote 
well-informed decision making in order to formulate a joint response. The NRP further 
ensures a joint operation with all components to ensure effective distribution of resources 
to mount an appropriate response (FEMA, 2011). 
A revised form of the NRP 2004, the National Response Framework (NRF) 2006, 
was implemented after Hurricane Katrina, which occurred in 2005. The NRF “is always 
in effect, and elements can be implemented at any time,” as stated in the scope of that 
framework (FEMA, 2016, p. 5). As a guiding principle in engaging in partnerships with 
whole communities and with stakeholders, the NRF promotes coordination and direct 
integration with:  
 Individuals, families, and households 
 Non-government organizations  
 Private sector companies  
 District governments 
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 States, ethnic, territorial and insular area governments 
 Central government (FEMA, 2016) 
Figure 6 depicts response operational planning under the national preparedness 
system.   
 
Figure 6.  Alignment of Planning Efforts with PPD8-National Preparedness. 
Source: FEMA (June 2016). 
3. National Disaster Response Management in Pakistan  
Pakistan has been exposed to several catastrophes, both natural disaster as well as 
man-made. An earthquake on October 8, 2005, was one of the most casualty intense 
disasters to hit Pakistan in recent history. This event forced the government to establish 
disaster management agencies to ensure an appropriate response. After the incident, the 
government of Pakistan passed legislation (Act No. XXIV, 2010) to institutionalize a 
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National Disaster Management System, to provide unified relief and support during 
disaster situations and mitigate the coordination challenges (NA, 2010). The act provides 
a comprehensive roadmap to establish an organization that covers each tierfrom the 
national level down to the provinces and the districts as wellin order to instill a unified 
response to emergencies. As an outcome of the act, the National Disaster Management 
Commission (NDMC), National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Provincial 
Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), and District Disaster Management Authority 
(DDMA) have been established. 
a. National Disaster Management Commission  
As previously mentioned, the NDMC was established through the National 
Disaster Management System for Pakistan Act (NDMSPA) of 2010. NDMC consists of 
the Prime Minister of Pakistan as chairman, leaders of the opposition, ministers of major 
federal ministries, and chief ministers of all provinces as members of the commission. 
According to NDMSPA, the commission is responsible for formulating a comprehensive 
framework for disaster management, guidelines for planning and integration of 
government and private resources, capability development, and resource allocation (NA, 
2010). Further details on the role of the NDMC are given in Appendix C. 
b. National Disaster Management Authority  
The NDMA acts as the primary organization to ensure implementation of the 
plans prepared to address the challenges of the disaster relief and preparation operations 
and to ensure a high degree of coordination in the field during relief operations. The 
national authority consists of several members as may be prescribed and shall be headed 
by a Director General (NA, 2010). As per the NDMSPA, 2010, the authority is to act as 
the implementing and coordinating body to plan, execute, and monitor the response at all 
tiers. It also formulates the framework and guidelines for provisional and district level 
authorities in capacity development and building relations with local and private players. 
The functions of NDMA are detailed in Appendix C. Figure 7 depicts the organizational 
structure of NDMA.  
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Figure 7.  NDMA Organization Chart. Source: National Disaster Management 
Authority Organization Chart, http://www.ndma.gov.pk/ndma. 
c. Provincial Disaster Management Authority  
According to the National Disaster Management System for Pakistan Act of 2010, 
as a policymaking board of the Provincial Disaster Management Commission (PDMC), 
PDMA is responsible to coordinate and implement the national policies at the provincial 
level in light of the NDMA guidelines. As the second tier of NDMS, PDMA coordinates 
and monitors the response with district level authorities and formulates a plan in line with 
the national plan. PDMA also ensures preparedness at the provincial level and promotes 
general awareness among the public about the national and provincial response plans. 
The detailed mandate of PDMA is given in Appendix C.  
d. District Disaster Management Authority  
The DDMA is a local authority in charge of planning, coordinating, and 
implementing the NDMA disaster policy at the respective district level, in accordance 
with the directions of the NDMA and PDMA (NA, 2010). The NDMSPA of 2010 states 
that the local council head within a district administers the DDMA and includes all the 
department heads at the district level. Positioned at the lowest tier, the DDMA is directly 
involved in disaster relief with local authorities and coordinates with the PDMA and 
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NDMA for efficient sharing of resources and information, vertically and horizontally. 
The DDMA conducts and coordinates the requisite training and preparedness of 
workforce, and establishes relations with local communities and players. The functions of 
the DDMA are detailed in Appendix C.  
e. Framework 
To reduce disaster risk, the Government of Pakistan implements policies, 
strategies, and programs that are administered by the NDMA. The national disaster risk 
management framework acts as a guideline for authorities who must work together with 
all stakeholders for national preparedness (NDMA, 2007). Moreover, the framework 
makes it a legally required effort to plan and develop the response from national to the 
local level in all phases of a disaster. Key points of the framework are (NDMA, 2007): 
 Establishing legal framework for management of risk  
 Assessing hazards and vulnerability to disaster within the country 
 Conducting training, education, and promoting awareness among all 
components on disaster preparedness 
 Planning disaster risk management  
 Programming disaster management at the community level  
 Developing an early warning system with a focus on more than one hazard as 
an integral part of disaster management 
 Community development with a focus on reducing disaster risk  
 Establishment of a detailed response mechanism for emergencies  
 Recovering after a disaster and developing the capacity of communities 
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA, n.d.) has created a 
graphic representation of the framework tasked to mitigate and prevent the detrimental 




Figure 8.  Structure for Disaster Risk Management. Source: National Disaster 
Management Authority, http://www.ndma.gov.pk. 
4. Disaster Response Management in Indonesia  
The Indonesian government issued Presidential Regulation No. 8/2008 to 
establish the  National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana [BNPB]), the leading authority in HADR operations within the country.  
a. National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana) 
The objective of the BNPB is to coordinate and implement a planned, integrated, 
and comprehensive disaster management policy (BNPB, n.d). As a leading authority, 
BNPB has significant responsibilities to provide the framework and guidelines and the 
directions to implement a response plan at the national and local levels. Furthermore, it 
must ensure capacity building and the sharing of resources and information among key 
players (BNPB, 2015b). The roles and functions of the BNPB are detailed in  
Appendix D.  
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In addition to formulating and establishing disaster management policy, this 
office is responsible for managing internally displaced personals to reduce human 
suffering. The head of BNPB reports directly to the president and interfaces with 
members of several disaster management entities, consisting of ten government officials 
from echelon I or the equivalent and nine members from the professional community 
(Setneg, n.d.). Figure 9 depicts the organizational structure of Indonesia’s National 
Disaster Management Authority (BNPB. n.d.). 
 
Figure 9.  Structure or Indonesian National Disaster Management Authority 
(BNPB). Source: BNPB, http://www.bnpb.go.id/home/struktur. 
b. The Local Board of Disaster Relief  
The Local Board of Disaster Relief (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah 
[BPBD]) is the authority that is responsible for managing disaster recovery, including the 
fulfillment of the rights of communities and refugees affected by the disaster, based on 
the minimum service standards. The board also ensures the protection of the communities 
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from the impact of the disaster and ensures disaster risk reduction (BNPB, 2007). 
According to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 24 of 2007 concerning 
Disaster Management, an officer under each governor heads the Provincial Board of 
Disaster Relief (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah Provinsi [BPBD Provinsi]) and 
an officer under each mayor leads the District Board of Disaster Relief (Badan 
Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah Kota [BPBD Kota]). The mandate of BPPD is given in 
Appendix D.  
c. Framework 
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia learned from the incident of the 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which was a massive disaster. The Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Number 24 of 2007 concerning Disaster Management, institutes the 
foundation of disaster management through the BNPB and BPBD under a legal 
framework. The document highlights the national and local government responsibilities, 
the rights and obligations of communities and businesses, and the role of international 
organizations, as well as the stages and requirements of disaster management, resource 
allocation, and management for disaster relief (Setneg, n.d.)). The law emphasizes 
capability development, inter-agency integration, and the need for engaging NGOs in the 
post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in the long term. The law 
welcomes international organizations and foreign NGOs to contribute in disaster relief 
where their workers are given protection by the government to participate freely. The 




Figure 10.  The National Structure of Disaster Management in Indonesia. Source: 
BNPB (2015a). 
B. SELECTED HADR OPERATIONS 
This section examines selected human aid and disaster relief operations from 
three different countries. The literature review detailed in Chapter II enabled us to 
shortlist the selected operations. The major criteria for selection are the ‘magnitude of the 
disaster’ (the greater the magnitude, the greater will be the influx of NGOs, other 
humanitarian organizations, and the military component) and the period from 2004 to 
2005, during which the world witnessed major natural disasters in different parts of the 
world simultaneously. Wiley C. Thompson (2010)explains that modern disaster relief 
operations include representatives from the host nation, NGOs, civil volunteers, and 
militaries. Each component is unique due to its expertise in a particular field, which 
contributes greatly toward the achievement of the overall goal (Thompson, 2010).  
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1. Pakistan 2005 Earthquake and Civil-Military Coordination 
To understand the impact of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, which shook more 
than half of the country, we need to understand the geographical setting of the country. 
According to Sarah J. Halvorson and Jennifer Parker Hamilton (2010), the topography of 
the area affected is extremely mountainous. This area includes Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
province, which at the time of the earthquake was called the North Western Frontier 
Province, and part of Azad Jammu and Kashmir province on the western edge of 
Himalayas. Halvorson also quotes Fawad Khan and Daanish Mustafa (2007), asserting 
that, “In the past 75 years three earthquakesQuetta (1935), Makran (1945) and Kashmir 
(2005)have exceeded magnitude 7.5 and together caused more than 120,000 deaths” 
(p. 186); the climate is hot but experiences snow between the months of November and 
March (Halvorson & Parker Hamilton, 2010). The population of the area depends on 
agriculture, animals, and fruits from the area for its livelihood. Halvorson and Parker 
Hamilton (2010) state that a total of 466 tent camps were established to support the relief 
operation and a total of 252,000 individuals were provided shelter in this operation 
(Mahmood, 2007, cited in Halvorson & Parker Hamilton, 2010). With this understanding 
of the population in Pakistan that was most directly affected by the disaster, let us turn 
our attention to the details of the earthquake itself and the subsequent relief operation. 
Although Pakistan was shaken by the 7.6 magnitude earthquake on October 8, 
2005, the surrounding region was also hit. This area included countries such as India, 
Afghanistan, and other surrounding countries. David Patley, Stuart Dunning, Nicholas 
Rosser (2010) published in SAARC workshop on Landslide Risk Management in South 
Asia mentions,  that the incident was triggered by a 100-kilometer-long rupture of the 
Balakot – Bagh fault line. As a result of the disaster, approximately 38,000 people were 
injured, 3.5 million were left homeless, and a total of 780,000 structures was damaged 
beyond repair. It has been estimated at $3.5 billion reconstruction cost (Petley et al., 
2006). Esther K. Hicks and Gregory Pappas (2006) explain that the epicenter of the 
earthquake was approximately 100 kilometers northeast of Islamabad, the worst hit area 
was Pakistan Administered Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 
which covered 30,000 square kilometers, and has a population of approximately 4 to 5 
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million (Hicks & Pappas, 2006). It was the strongest earthquake since the Quetta 
earthquake of 1935. Wiley C. Thompson (2010) states that the Earthquake at Quetta had 
killed approximately 35,000 people, while the 2005 earthquake left 79,000 people dead; 
many more were injured, and more than two million were left homeless (Thompson, 
2010). According to the early recovery framework of 2005 from the UN office at 
Islamabad, there were a total of 1200 aftershocks until the end 2005, a total of 84 percent 
housing stock was damaged or destroyed in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the 
number of people affected was 3.5 million, and they needed immediate assistance (United 
Nations, n.d.). The early recovery framework (2005) also cites UNICEF and UNFPA, 
respectively, in declaring that a total of 955,000 school-going children and 800,000 
women between the ages of 15 and 49 were affected (United Nations, n.d.).  
It is important to mention that the Pakistan emergency response was basically 
guided by the Calamity Act of 1958, which was a reactive form of response (NDMA 
report 2007–2008). In light of this shortfall, Pakistan identified after 2005 earthquake that 
we need to have a proactive approach instead of a reactive approach and develop a 
disaster management body to harness this threat. Thompson while explaining the 
problems faced by Pakistan during 2005 earthquake mentions that Task Force Griffin (TF 
Griffin), being part of 12th  Aviation Brigade, on October 9, 2005, got orders to deploy in 
Pakistan for the provision of humanitarian aid. It was also supported by “three UH-60 
and five CH-47 helicopters from Afghanistan for Qasim Airbase in Rawalpindi, 
Pakistan” (Thompson, 2010). In addition to the Pakistan military, the operation was also 
supported by 19 other militaries in the relief effort. The basic guidelines to be followed 
for this mission were the Oslo Guidelines of May 1994 (Cosgrave & Herson, 2008). The 




Figure 11.  Earthquake Affected Areas in Pakistan. Source: BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/image_maps/05/1129000000/
1129569263/img/asia_quake2_click_map416.gif. 
The Early Recovery Framework report (UN, 2005) states that the national 
response, including civilians, government bodies, and the army, was exemplary. The 
report emphasizes that the government immediately established the Federal Relief 
Commission (FRC) (United Nations early recovery framework, n.d.; Hicks & Pappas, 
2006) with an aim to coordinate all the relief efforts, and it also established the 
Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA) to ensure the rebuilding 
effort, which was the main contact point for international lenders and other international 
organizations desirous to support the relief effort. The FRC is headed by a Federal Relief 
Commissioner, who reports directly to the prime minister. As per the report, the Prime 
Minster of Pakistan on  October 17, 2005, announced a 12-point relief plan while the 
government announced a National Action Plan on November 1 of that year, with an aim 
to address the logistical and other challenges. The report asserts that the “cabinet also 
constituted four Committees to supervise the relief, rescue, and rehabilitation work of the 
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government; i.e., the Foreign Aid Committee, the Local Resources Mobilization 
Committee, and the Committees for AJK and NWFP with field offices in Mansehra and 
Muzaffarabad that oversee operations on-the-spot, ensuring that relief assistance reaches 
those in need without delay” (section 1.1.2) of the (United Nations, n.d.).  
Bollen (2008) in his book Managing Civil-Military Cooperation explains that the 
Pakistan Government requested support from NATO, which approved and deployed a 
team on October 11, 2005. It was a joint force package that included a NATO Disaster 
Relief Team. NATO also sent supported from Turkey on October 19 in the form of a 
huge quantity of supplies donated by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). Bollen also mentions that NATO established its headquarters in 
Pakistan to support this operation, along with a Spanish engineering team, and assisted in 
road repairs and construction of medical facilities. In addition, the Dutch Multinational 
Relief Hospital arrived, which was instrumental in providing medical relief, especially 
mobile teams for surgical support (Bollen, 2008).  
The Early Recovery Framework also explains that the responsibility of overall 
coordination of international relief falls on the shoulders of UNOCHA (Bollen, 2008). 
UNOCHA in the case of Pakistan was supporting the UN coordinator based in the capital 
city of Islamabad. The framework also explains that UNOCHA provided support through 
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team and established the 
Humanitarian Information Center. For the smooth flow of relief goods, it also established 
UN Field Hubs in Bagh, Bagram, Mansehr, and Muzaffarabad. On the ground, the 
detailed cooperation among agencies was ensured by the United Nations Disaster 
Management Team (UNDMT). During this effort, a total of 400 plus individuals as part 
of relief force were employed by the UN (United Nations, n.d.). In explaining the 
framework, Myriame T.I.B. Bollen (2008) states that UNOCHA was in charge of the 
overall coordination in the field, adopting the cluster approach at the provincial and 
district levels. It focused on the lead agency in each sector to ensure “quality, 
consistency, and predictability of relief effort” ( Bollen, 2008, p. 82). The cluster 
approach took the form depicted in Figure 12: 
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Figure 12.  Organization of a Single Cluster. Adapted from Bollen (2008, p. 83). 
It was well understood during this event by the Pakistan government in general 
and the Pakistan military in particular that the media is an important component of the 
relief effort. The media not only mobilizes the effort but gives recognition to those who 
are working and encourages those who want to participate. A number of media personnel 
were seen at the aviation base Chaklala, in Rawalpindi. They were transported to the 
affected area on relief flights, on which one or two seats were always reserved for them. 
This ensured the accurate reporting and the first-hand account of the relief effort. 
According to Thompson’s account, TF Griffin managed all the aviation effort for relief to 
the forward areas. By establishing a tent control station at the aviation base, they took on 
the responsibility to coordinate the aviation support. In the words of Thompson (2010): 
TF Griffin leadership made three very important contributions. First, they 
ensured standardization of aviation operations between as many 
organizations as possible, preventing a potential aviation disaster. Second, 
they relieved the Pakistani Army aviation personnel from adding this 
briefing requirement to their already overworked force and lastly, by 
acknowledging in all of their actions that the Pakistanis were in charge of 
the relief operation and that all mission requirements should originate 
from the Pakistanis, TF Griffin set an example of full integration, which 
many other organizations followed as they came on board. (pp. 9–10) 



















Figure 13.  Army Aviation Tasking Chain. Source: Thompson (2010). 
The collaboration between different humanitarian organizations, or between 
foreign militaries supporting an operation, can play a critical role and result in better 
performance. Thompson (2010) explains that during the support mission in Pakistan, a 
logistical situation arose when the British Royal Air Force (RAF) helicopter squadron 
had to decide on its living quarters and operations room at Qasim Base, Rawalpindi. The 
RAF squadron opted for a joint arrangement with its U.S. counterparts. It was a critical 
point from the logistics point of view as the RAF would have expended much effort 
establishing the same facilities for its own use, while TF Griffin had already established 
the facility.. Nevertheless, a gap in trust between the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) and TF Griffin had to be bridged. The DFID did not 
want risk its reputation by not knowing whether TF Griffin had any hidden agenda. The 
gap in trust, though, was effectively bridged by TF Griffin, which offered DFID 
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personnel the opportunity to fly with them on a mission. This enabled DFID to see how 
TF Griffin worked, and as a result, DFID agreed to merge facilities, functions, and 
operations with TF Griffin, achieving a stronger relationship and better performance on 
the ground (Thompson, 2010). 
The relief operation in Pakistan is viewed as a very successful one in which the 
initial response came from inside the host nation of Pakistan and later support from other 
entities, including the United States and NATO. Wilder (2010) states that the overall 
response was viewed as a successful operation by the aid workers and officials, who 
aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering. There was very little loss of life after the 
initial loss, and that is the strongest proof of the standard of a relief operation (Wilder, 
2010).  
Wilder further explains some unique phenomena of this relief effort, reflecting the 
motivation and the level of the commitment of not only the organizations working to 
provide relief but also the governments and larger organizations involved. Wilder quotes 
a senior UN official who said that this was one of the only situations in which NATO, Al-
Qaeda, and Western NGOs have worked together. There was no discrimination in this 
case. Several UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and 
NGOs worked together and delivered support goods through Jihadi organizations, and 
seeing the situation on ground it is safe to say this cooperation was a logistical necessity 
in the initial stages of the operation (Wilder, 2010). Notably, militant organizations were 
able to mobilize 2,500 volunteers who were vital in the burial of the dead, delivering 
relief goods, erecting medical facilities, and in the establishment of the schools (Wilder, 
2010). 
With an aim to enhance the response capacity and to enhance the preparedness, 
UNOCHA in mid-2005 started developing a cluster sectoral leadership approach focused 
on ten core areas of humanitarian activity. This was organized under an inter-agency 
standing committee (IASC). In the meantime, the South Asia earthquake happened and 
this cluster sectoral system was put to test. It was an event in which major agencies 
governed and funded separately came together in a single operation with the same 
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objective. This cluster approach was active in Geneva, Islamabad, and at the field level in 
the areas hit by the earthquake. Ten clusters were established under various UN agencies 
and partners, which oversaw shelter, food and nutrition, health, water and sanitation, 
camp management, logistics, protection, education, IT/telecommunication, and early 
reconstruction and recovery (Hicks & Pappas, 2006). The model was adopted by not only 
the UN agencies but also by the Pakistan military, NGOs, and the private sector. Overall 
responsibility for tcoordinating all the assistance was with UNOCHA. UNOCHA did the 
task through UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team, which focuses on rapid 
assessment and supports the HN and UN coordinators; it established a Humanitarian 
Information Center and set up UN field hubs (in four locations) to ensure a decentralized 
approach (Hicks & Pappas, 2006).  
In comparison to the 2005 earthquake previously detailed, the loss of human lives, 
livestock, and infrastructure was huge during this disaster. The total cost was USD 5.2 
billion (as shown in Table 4). The initial cost estimates were USD 398 million to address 
early recovery, which focused on the cash payment for rubble clearance, micro-financing 
projects, and the reduction of disaster risk. It also aimed at capacity building for local 
governance (United Nations, n.d.). 
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 Estimated Cost of the Earthquake. Source: United Nations (n.d., p. 2).  Table 4.  
 
 
2. Hurricane Katrina  and Inter-organizational Coordination 
Hurricane Katrina is declared to be among the most destructive tropical cyclones 
ever to hit the United States. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA, as cited by Zimmermann, 2015), the hurricane developed on 
August 23, southeast of the Bahamas. It first made landfall on August 25 at Southern 
Florida and was ranked as a category 1 hurricane. Then, as  it turned toward the 
Louisiana-Mississippi border on August 29, it was raised to a category 3 storm, with 
sustained winds of 120 miles per hour (NOAA Public Affairs, 2007, as cited by 
Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). Figure 14 shows the track of the hurricane as it developed 
and made landfalls through August 31. 
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Figure 14.  The Path and Strength of Hurricane Katrina with Dates. Source: Butts, 
Acton, and Marcum (2012). 
The hurricane and ensuing floods took 1,852 lives, affected 8.3 million people, 
and caused estimated damage totaling $157 billion in the affected area (see Table 5; data 
retrieved from http://www.emdat.be). Before Hurricane Katrina became an extratropical 
low and was finally absorbed over the eastern Great Lakes on August 31, it had affected 
Florida, Louisiana, New Orleans, Mississippi, and some parts of Alabama and Kentucky. 
The ensuing storm surge, ranging 10 to 28 feet across, devastated New Orleans, a city 
built under sea-level. The storm surge ruptured the federal levees system and flooded 80 
percent of the city and the surrounding area for next few weeks (Moynihan, 2009). This 
situation resulted in the displacement of more than 1 million people, one of the largest 
displacements. The government response to this catastrophe was slow, with bureaucratic 
breakdown involving the government at all tiers (Clarke, 2006). However, in the case of 
the humanitarian response, Lee Clarke (2006) mentions that civil organizations played 
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the key role, as was acknowledged by the White House (2006, p.125). Clarke also 
mentions that every national, state, local, and many international organizations provided 
aid and relief to the victims.  
 Detail of Losses due Hurricane Katrina Government Response. Table 5.  
Adapted from Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(n.d.), www.emdat.be. 
Loss Estimated number 
Total Area affected 90,000 square miles 
Total Deaths 1,833 
Total Affected  500,000 people 
Estimated Damage $125 billion 
 
Hurricane Katrina can be classified as a slow-onset disaster, but government 
agencies were caught unprepared (Moynihan, 2009). The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) is considered to be the lead agency to coordinate and 
monitor the response by other federal agencies under the framework of the National 
Response Plan (NRP), 2004. However, since the establishment of FEMA in 1979, the 
agency has remained “a parking lot for political appointees” by U.S. presidents (Bosner, 
2005). After 9/11, the FEMA response to emergencies was examined and a higher level 
federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security, was established with an aim to 
unite 22 smaller federal agencies under one umbrella. As an outcome of this directive, 
FEMA, formerly an independent agency, became a sub-department of DHS, which 
placed FEMA under the heavy layers of bureaucratic channels, in terms of resources and 
autonomy of operations. Under this reorganization, FEMA failed to enhance coordination 
and capacity to react to national disasters.  
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As Katrina approached, state and city officials were unprepared. Media created 
pressure on response actors to show up with a plan, the Mayor of New Orleans, Ray 
Nagin, called for the immediate mandatory evacuation of citizens just a few hours short 
of the hurricane (Moynihan, 2009), but by then it was too late. State and local officials 
failed to forecast the magnitude of the upcoming hurricane and did not reinforce pre-
positioned stocks and equipment. The National Guard of Louisiana was trapped in the 
water and unable to react to the situation. Infrastructure was completely destroyed; there 
was no electricity and no communication network available for the next two days. FEMA 
instead of accepting its incapacity to react kept blaming local and state authorities for the 
failed immediate response. FEMA also characterized their demands for help as improper 
even after New Orleans was flooded. Government officials kept claiming they had 
dispatched relief efforts, but the media continuously showed that no relief was in progress 
until three days after Katrina. The National Guard, which was also trapped in the water, 
made a number of requests to FEMA for the provision of support machinery to initiate 
relief efforts, but FEMA did not have the capacity to provide help. Six days after the 
continuing catastrophe, the White House realized the gravity of the situation and declared 
a state of emergency, calling for the military. U.S. NORTHCOM established JF-Katrina 
and started medical evacuation operations immediately. Finally, troops touched the 
ground on September 5 and the situation started to improve (Kochems, 2005). As per the 
press release of U.S. NORTHCOM of September 7, 2005 (as cited by Kochems, 2005), 
the total strength of National Guard personnel was 42,990; active military personnel 
numbered 17,417; 20 ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed-wing aircraft also took part in 
the relief operation. 
As compared to the government response to the disaster, the response of the civil 
community was quick and effective, but it was limited due to capacity constraints. Many 
of the local, state, national, and international NGOs provided humanitarian aid and relief 
within the United States for the first time (Eikenberry, Arroyave, & Cooper, 2007). The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office confirms that the charitable contributions alone 
from in-country and international sources reached $ 3.3 billion. However, FEMA was 
unable to efficiently accept and manage the goods and services offered by NGOs 
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(Townsend, 2006). Frances Fragos Townsend’s report on the government’s response to 
Hurricane Katrina asserts that the federal government was unable to integrate outside 
assistance to support overall operation. As an example, he recounts that aid from 
Switzerland was canceled due to a packaging issue raised by FEMA. Moreover, he 
further highlights that U.S. NORTHCOM was not ready to accept the offer from 
Germany to allow satellite communication capable of supporting 5,000 mobile calls 
simultaneously to coordinate the relief operation. The Red Cross initiated one of its 
largest disaster responses for the victims of Hurricane Katrina (Red Cross, 2015). As per 
the Red Cross official website, more than 245,000 Red Cross workers participated in the 
relief operation; providing more than 3.8 million overnight stays, 68 million meals and 
snacks, and financial assistance to 1.4 million families. According to Romin Lail (2014), 
UNICEF raised $127 million and supplied relief goods; Doctors without Borders sent 
over 100 doctors and supplied more than 1,000 first aid kits; Free for Children 
contributed over $ 1 million and helped rebuild schools in affected areas. Some of private 
companies such as Walmart, Home Depot, and State Farm Insurance were even able to 
pre-position relief goods a week before Hurricane Katrina hit (Sobel & Leeson, 2006). 
3. Indonesia 2004 Tsunami and Civil-military Coordination  
Sunday morning of December 26, 2004, was frightening for most of the people in 
the Province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; it was when an enormous earthquake 
measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale rocked the coast of Indonesia (Margesson, 2005). 
While it was the deadliest earthquake of the 21st century, it also became the cause of a 
tsunami in nearby coastal countries in Asia. According to EM-DAT, the international 
disaster database, the disaster resulted in more than 226,000 of total deaths in eight 
countries, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand (Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster, n.d.). Figure 
15 shows the areas affected, along with the number of causalities.  
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Figure 15.   The Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Source: Bing, 
bing.com (n.d.). 
The database indicates that the earthquake and subsequent tsunami affected more 
than two million people and resulted in destruction costing more than $9 billion . Warren 
Bell Hamilton (1979) mentions that Indonesia is prone to natural disaster as the country is 
in an active seismic region and at the meeting point of three tectonic plates, including the 
Eurasia Plate, the Pacific Plate, and the Indian-Australia Plate (Hamilton, 1979).  
The Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, the most western part of the 
Indonesian archipelago, lies between 01⁰37.2” and 06⁰04’33.6” North Latitude and 
between 94⁰57’57.66” and 98⁰17’13.2” East Longitude and is an average of 125 meters 
above sea level. When the greatest earthquake struck the area, its epicenter was 30 
kilometers under the sea bed and 250 kilometers southwest of Banda Aceh, the capital of 
the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (UNOCHA, 2005). This seismic movement 
was the largest in the world.  
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The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 2004 states that the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) is an instrument of 
national defense, mandated to help the government by acting in a direct support role in 
the case of any natural disasters (Setneg, n.d.). TNI was the leading actor that 
immediately responded to the incident with assistance and relief operations in 2004 (TNI, 
2005). 
In the 2004 event of the earthquake and tsunami, the TNI, includes the Indonesian 
Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat [TNI AD]), the Indonesian Navy 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut [TNI AL]), and the Indonesian Air Force 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara [TNI AU]), worked as a joint force under 
the direction of Indonesian National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana [BNPB]). According to Minister of Defense Regulation 
Number 06 of 2015, the involvement of TNI is a process of participation in which TNI as 
an integral part of BNPB focuses on preparing for and during the disaster, as well as on 
post-disaster response (Ditjenpp, n.d.).  
According to Wiharta et al. (2008), much international assistance was also needed 
in light of the magnitude of relief work required. The international community’s response 
was overwhelming and immediate. “Thirty-five states contributed 75 helicopters, 41 
ships, 43 fixed-wing aircraft, and more than 30 000 personnel, including air traffic 
controllers, medical teams, and engineers” (Wiharta et al., 2008, p. 87). It included 16 
Armed Forces from overseas countries, 14 UN organizations, and also 195 global HADR 
organizations. TNI played the role of lead agency on the ground to communicate and 
coordinate with international military support. The foreign military components worked 
side-by-side on a common mandate of the relief operation.  
Moreover, the report highlighted the role of international counterparts. The 
Australian Defense Force provided initial rescue in the district of Banda Aceh starting on 
December 27, 2004 (Wiharta et al. 2008). They supported the Indonesian government’s 
operation by sending the C-130 Hercules and the HMAS Kanimbla; the support also 
included support goods such as medical supplies, shelters food, and water. As the closest 
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neighboring country, Singapore’s Armed Forces also sent their C-130, Chinook, and 
Super Puma helicopters with relief goods. Meanwhile, the U.S. Pacific Command (US 
PACOM) provided post-disaster HADR support by sending the fleet, ranging from the 
carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to the hospital ship USN Mercy (Wiharta et al. 2008). 
Japan’s Self-Defense Force, New Zealand, and the European countries also contributed to 
the relief effort; however, due to a lack of updated situational information, there was a 
lack of coordination at Aceh between the international militaries and TNI (Wiharta et al., 
2008).  
According to the United Nations report on the flash appeal of the Indian Ocean 
Earthquake-Tsunami of 2005, UN agencies and NGOs responded to the disaster in a 
strategic, efficient, and coordinated manner for millions of affected people in several 
Asian countries (UNOCHA, 2005). The organizations working together also built a 
strong relationship and established sound communication at the government and 
institution level. In the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which was one of the 
most affected areas, UNOCHA established an office in the area to support what was 
called the Humanitarian Information Center. This office maintained and enhanced the 
capability of UN country workgroups. UNOCHA also focused on improving its special 
task force capabilities based on the lessons learn from the tsunami disaster. They also 
asked international humanitarian organizations to enhance their relief effort in 
collaboration with UN headquarters (Mayer, Sri, & December, n.d.).  
In post-disaster humanitarian assistance in Aceh, UNICEF played a significant 
role, especially focusing on children who lost their families and needed support at that 
critical point. It also contributed to the effort in the areas of sanitation, protection, and 
education (Unicef, 2006).  
According to a World Bank (2005) report cited by Prema-Chandra Athukorala 
and Budy P. Resosudarmo (2005), the total impact of the losses and damage caused by 
earthquake and tsunami in Aceh was roughly USD 4.45 billion. The estimated losses by 
sector are shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.  Indonesia’s Estimated Damages and Losses from 2005 Earthquake and 
Tsunami. Source: World Bank, as cited in Athukorala and 
Resosudarmo (2005). 
C. INTERVIEW RESPONSES – INSIGHT ON MAJOR COORDINATION 
ISSUES 
The authors of this study approached leaders and representatives of different 
agencies, including the military, NGOs, and UN organizations, to gain a better 
understanding of each organization’s point of view on the subject of civil-military 
coordination in selected operations. We were able to get a very positive response from 
Director General (DG) NDMA Pakistan, Major General Asghar Nawaz, and the Director 
of Field and Systems Integration for the American Red Cross (ARC), Mr. Luke 
Beckman. We also sent a questionnaire to and tried to organize an interview with a 
representative from UNOCHA and a representative from BNPB, Indonesia; however, it 
was unsuccessful. The important issues in coordination during HADR operations cited by 
our respondents are shown in Table 6. 
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 Interview Responses Identifying HADR Operation Coordination Table 6.  
Challenges. 
Response from Coordination challenges 
NDMA response  Non-availability of disaster relief framework 
 Lack of inter-agency coordination 
 Logistic challenges 
 Non-availability of on-duty officials in disaster areas 
being causalities themselves 
 Non-availability of updated maps 
 Lack of information sharing and information 
management structure  
 Inadequate joint training 
 
ARC response  Non- existence of common framework 
 Weak relationship with locals 
 Lack of free flow of information among organizations 
 Lack of good working relations among organizations 
 Non-availability of communication interface 
 Dependent on government-hosted joint exercises 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. COORDINATION ISSUES IN SELECTED OPERATIONS 
Based on the literature review and data collection in previous chapters, here we 
will focus on the three selected operations to identify the specific problem areas and the 
measures taken during and after the relief operations to enhance coordination.  
1. Pakistan Earthquake 2005 – Problem Areas Identified 
 In the relief operation following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, it was Pakistan 
Army that served as the main driving force, and necessitated their coordination of all the 
support agencies working in the field. The army had the advantage of knowing the area 
and had the largest logistic and transport support. The major shortfalls in coordination 
included lack of clarity about which organization was doing what, where, and for how 
long. UNOCHA had provided the overview of the cluster system implemented on the 
ground for the relief operation but failed to explain the procedure for coordinating 
activities in the center and infield. It was expected that all the cluster organizations would 
attend the operational meetings held at Islamabad but they failed to do so (Hicks & 
Pappas, 2006). The coordination of supplies on the ground, despite the meetings of 
cluster heads, was wanting. NGOs did not have the staff to send for the meetings, which 
left voids in the coordination. This coordination void resulted in duplication of effort. In 
the entire operation, the lack of national capacity was a hindrance as dependence was 
centered in the military, where, for example, there was no clear internally displaced 
persons policy; the military had an authoritative role at all levels as the HN was 
depending too heavily on the armed forces (Hicks & Pappas, 2006). These points, if 
addressed, would have made this operation a textbook example of an effective disaster 
relief operation. Even so, it has been taken as a successful operation.  
UN Early recovery framework on Pakistan earthquake (2005) emphasizes a 
number of flaws in the coordination of the relief operation, including unclear distribution 
of tasks for each of the ten clusters on the ground, the weak leadership of the clusters, 
lack of uniformity in policy between the agencies, and lack of coherent strategies. It also 
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highlights that the coordination between civil-military organizations needed fine tuning 
throughout the recovery process. The report points out that coordination at the local level 
was enhanced by establishing district relief and recovery committees (United Nations, 
n.d). This was important as the area which was hit by this massive earthquake was a 
remote hilly terrain and reaching those areas was difficult as the infrastructure was 
damaged, necessitating the use of local committees to work in their respective areas. In 
the initial stage of the operation, the military rather than local self-help groups came to 
survivors’ aid, and then other humanitarian organizations followed (United Nations, n.d). 
Halvorson (2010) echoes this view, mentioning the data collected from locals of the 
affected area, in their reply to the question, “who has helped you the most since the 
earthquake?” (p. 194). Almost half replied “NGOs,” a quarter replied “everyone 
provided support during this process”; it was also mentioned that the “government, local 
people, and Jamaat–i-Islami political party” at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provided the support 
(Halvorson & Parker Hamilton, 2010). This is an important observation as it helps us 
understand one phenomenon, which is that the army comes in early while it leaves early 
as well; by contrast, the NGOs stay in the affected area to support the people. That is the 
reason the answer from the locals is in favor of NGOs, which makes it more important to 
look for the long-term goals of these organizations. It is important to note that the 
military, although it normally is the first one to reach the affected area, does not remain 
as long as the NGOs. Thus, the military should work hand in hand with the NGOs and 
should also try to address the concerns raised by the NGOs (Halvorson & Parker 
Hamilton, 2010). 
The Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) is an initiative of the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator with an aim to gauge the response. The review by the UN (2005) 
identifies that the humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross/Red Crescent, the UN, 
NGOs, and the International Organization for Migration are very important to each other 
and there is a need to enhance the collaboration between these organizations to achieve 
better results (UN, 2005). The report also points out the low level of preparedness among 
the organizations in the field, which results from NGOs and UN organizations each 
having its own distinct way of approaching problems (UN, 2005). The report also points 
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out inefficient camp management, low quality of equipment, and a poor stockpiling 
registration system as few of the areas necessitating coordination (UN, 2005). 
The HRR (UN, 2005) also highlights the issue of staff with these humanitarian 
agencies. It is difficult for them to muster the trained manpower; they either draw relief 
workers from their standby pool or from their headquarters if they are big organizations. 
However, this staffing method affects the handling of an incident response and the 
support to that operation. If the organization is small, it depends on the local manpower, 
which normally is not well trained. The report also points out that it becomes difficult in 
the case of an emergency to coordinate the available manpower as volunteers have to 
travel and live in hard conditions even if the period is as short as 4 to 6 months (UN, 
2005). 
Christopher A. Curtis (2015), while discussing the problems related to the disaster 
relief, cites James L. Garnett and Alexander Kouzmin (2007) and points out the 
importance of information sharing and negotiations that take place between organizations 
once they are participating in a disaster relief operation. He further points out that the 
uninterrupted flow of information is of paramount importance in times of crisis (Curtis, 
2015). Richard J. Brennan and Ronald J. Waldman (2006), while discussing the problems 
related to coordination, mention a poor understanding of objectives, procedures, and 
responsibilities (Brennan & Waldman, 2006). Bollen (2008) mentions that although the 
humanitarian organizations showed concern about working with the military, it took a 
long time to make the military, NATO, and NGOs come together and understand each 
other’s capabilities. Bollen notes, “the way in which the Pakistani military took the lead 
in coordinating the relief operations, at times, frustrated civil-military cooperation” 
(Bollen, 2008, p. 83). In his book, Bollen also points out that due to cultural differences 
female healthcare workers of NGOs took the time to establish good working relations 
with the Pakistani authorities, especially with male members. Another important issue 
highlighted in the book is that female patients preferred to be treated by the female 
healthcare workers, which made the task of the relief workers difficult. Lack of 
information sharing among the organizations and military was also one of the glaring 
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issues as communication and flow of situational information largely depended upon the 
military means of communication. Organizations were trying to take a lead from one 
another, which resulted in the flow of fabricated information with an aim to show 
positive progress (Bollen, 2008). Delay in the periodical assessment was another flaw, 
which resulted in delayed refinement of procedures that could have enhanced 
coordination. Here, one of the authors of this study would also like to mention that Bollen 
(2008) recalls, “The commander of the Main Dressing Station stated that because of 
Army Regulations, it was prohibited to treat civilians and they restricted themselves to 
treating military and their relatives” (Bollen, 2008, p. 85); this was not the situation on 
ground as the author of the present study was part of this relief operation. The army was, 
in fact, willing to support civilians as well as the military, and they were welcome at all 
military setups.  
While explaining the coordination challenges related to civil-military support, 
Bollen (2008) mentions that priorities were not well defined. The military conducted pre-
winter contingency meetings to coordinate the relief effort to ensure the provision of 
winter tents and necessities to fight the cold, but Bollen points out that the required 
decisions in detailed coordination were not taken. The key relief organizations were not 
fully prepared to take on the relief task in such terrain and weather, and the relief workers 
were short of resources. Lack of central coordination for an evacuation and emergency 
system in the initial stages of the relief effort was also an important shortcoming 
highlighted by Bollen (Bollen, 2008).  
Cosgrave and Herson (2008) explain that a thorough needs assessment is 
important to mount an appropriate response. In this case, that could not be accomplished 
as the area affected was too large and the infrastructure was badly damaged. Even the 
military, which had reached the area earlier, was unable to assess the situation as they 
could travel only by air to do the assessment. Cosgrave and Herson (2008) also 
emphasize that it is important for all the actors in the relief effort to weigh the speed of 
response and quality of response in case of a sudden onset disaster. Time is of the 
paramount importance in this case. Halvorson (2010) mentions that “Humanitarian 
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agencies, therefore, have to balance effective interventions based on good assessment, 
and rapid interventions that have the greatest potential for saving lives” (Halvorson & 
Parker Hamilton, 2010, p. 4). The report also argues about the relationship of time 
elapsed after the event with the quality of potential, which includes saving lives, and 
quality of needs assessment, which is shown in Figure 17 (Halvorson & Parker Hamilton, 
2010). 
 
Figure 17.  Relationship of Time and Event with Quality of Potential. Source: 
Halvorson and Parker Hamilton (2010, p. 4). 
Cosgrave and Herson (2008) also point out that there was a shortage of skilled 
technical individuals from different fields and it was due to the ongoing humanitarian 
response to the tsunami and the crisis in Darfur during 2005–2006 (Cosgrave & Herson, 
2008, cited in Reed et al., 2007, p. 14). While referring to the ICRC review Cosgrave and 
Herson mention that a “key lesson in Pakistan is that rapid deployment does not 
necessarily equal a rapid response” (p. 189) cited Reed et al., 2007, p. 14.. The study also 
highlights that the requirement to replace the first wave of the local relief workers was 
also an important problem normally faced in all humanitarian relief operations (Cosgrave 
and Herson, p. 190). Another important point highlighted in the article is that due to the 
earthquake the organizations had to shift some of their relief workers from the December 
2004 Indian tsunami, bringing along lessons from the tsunami that were not applicable to 
the earthquake. While citing other sources (UNOCHA, CMCS, 2006), Cosgrave and 
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Herson point out the Oslo guidelines of 1994 followed in this case were found to be  
outdated, and this operation confirmed the need to revise them. The revised guidelines 
were issued in November 2006 (Cosgrave & Herson, 2008). Further, Cosgrove and 
Herson highlight that, as the operation was led by Pakistan military, there was a feeling 
that the flow of information regarding the relief effort was not always clear and easily 
available, and there was a gap in the relief goods distribution figures reported (Cosgrave 
& Herson, 2008, who cite Bauman, 2006, p. 3). These discrepancies were basically due to 
the security concerns of the military. While referring to the CARE evaluation on the 
involvement of the military, Cosgrave and Herson  highlight the unsuitability of the 
command and control structure of the military during the relief and recovery effort. The 
observation of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan was that, “military actors are 
neither trained nor sensitive to the importance of citizen participation. They are generally 
polite, but not tolerant of criticism and retaliate strongly against citizens when they 
criticize or protest” (Cosgrave & Herson, 2008, citing the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan, 2005, p. 24). The report also points out that, “community ownership was 
limited, as many decisions were taken by the military which was not under democratic 
control” (p. 205).  
a. Measures Taken to Enhance Coordination during Relief 
Keeping in mind the importance of interagency coordination especially for the 
humanitarian aid operations, a number of measures had been taken to ensure same. In 
light of the HRR (2005), the ICRC is designated as the lead agency to coordinate relief in 
armed conflict, but in the case of a natural disaster the same responsibility lies on the 
shoulders of the National Society. The HRR (2005) also highlights that IASC, as the 
main forum representing the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, NGOs, and the 
International Organization for Migration has made slow progress in the field of 
coordination, planning, and funding (HRR, 2005). The report also points to an important 
coordination function undertaken by the 21 Humanitarian Coordinators within the UN 
system, who are supported by an equal number of Resident Coordinators. These people 
are highly skilled and are professionals in the field, and Humanitarian Coordinators 
 73
cannot be replaced by Resident Coordinators. These people have advanced operational, 
diplomatic, and negotiation skills (UN, 2005).   
Bollen (2008) mentions that the medical support and evacuation of causalities was 
an issue, which has been mentioned previously; this issue was addressed by establishing a 
centralized evacuation and emergency system under the District Health Officer, who was 
supported by World Health Organization. The District Health Officer, though, lacked the 
experience and knowledge about public health care especially in affected areas; 
furthermore, he lacked the authority and support from the provincial government, which 
also affected the functioning of the surveillance and outbreak investigation teams and led 
to increased workload on the World Health Organization (Bollen, 2008). Bollen notes 
that in addition to international medical units, the army also established a Forward 
Treatment Center of 60 beds and a Main Dressing Station at Bagh district, and these 
facilities treated all civilian and military patients (Bollen, 2008). His book also 
emphasizes that UNOCHA and the World Health Organization tried to coordinate the 
healthcare support effort between civil-military organizations with an aim to ensure better 
relief effort, but they encountered major problems. Among them were non-attendance of 
meetings by a majority of health organization representatives, and the information 
provided to them was never updated, which resulted in a vague operational picture. It was 
also believed by the civil health organizations that military medical units lack 
understanding of the public health approach, and they lacked training and equipment to 
deal with disasters. These findings also show that the monitoring and evaluation of the 
healthcare response was also poor (Bollen, 2008). 
Cosgrave and Herson (2008) point out that the role of the military in this whole 
operation was remarkable and was commended by all the participants; despite its limited 
capacity, “it insisted on controlling the process” (p. 197). They also cite the UNOCHA 
donor support group which states, “[a] key characteristic of the earthquake response was 
strong national leadership in the form of the Pakistan military …” (Cosgrave & Herson, 
2008, citing ODSG, 2006). An important step was taken by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, which supported the operation by providing assistance with information, 
counseling, and legal support; the council also helped people get identity cards so that 
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they could apply for compensation by the government. This initiative can be taken as a 
model for future disaster relief efforts (Cosgrave & Herson, 2008). The process was 
facilitated by the military.  
b. Measures Taken after the Disaster to Enhance Capacity and 
Coordination 
After the 2005 earthquake, the Government of Pakistan took measures to 
overcome the problems faced during the relief effort. According to the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) annual report of 2007–2008, the prevailing emergency 
response prior to the 2005 earthquake was based on a reactive approach, and it stayed that 
way until 2006. After this, a relief commission at the provincial level was established, an 
Emergency Relief Cell was established in the Cabinet Secretariat that focused on the 
response coordination at the federal level; initially “an ad-hoc Federal Relief Commission 
(FRC) was established which coordinated the most intricate relief and rescue operation 
which was hailed the world over” (NDMA, 2009, p. v). The report also states the 
promulgation of the National Disaster Management Ordinance in December 2006 to spell 
out the disaster management at the federal, provincial, and local levels. In light of this 
ordinance under the chairmanship of the prime minister, the National Disaster 
Management Commission (NDMC) was also established, and its members included: 
Leader of the opposition in the Senate, leader of the opposition in the 
National Assembly, Minister of Defense, Minister for Health, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Social Welfare & Special Education, Minister 
for Communications, Minister for Finance, Minister for Interior, Governor 
[ Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] (for Federally Administered Tribal Areas - 
FATA), Chief Minister of 04 Provinces, Prime Minister of [Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir] AJ&K, Chief Executive of Northern Areas, Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) or any other person appointed by the 
Prime Minister. ((NDMA, 2009) 
The report highlights that the NDMA was established as an executive body on 
January 18, 2007. This agency is responsible for coordinating the whole of the relief 
effort at the federal level (NDMA, 2009). As a result of a detailed analysis of the relief 
effort during 2005 earthquake and in light of the annual report 2007–2008 resulted in the 
National Disaster Risk Management Framework which aimed at “[Establishing] 
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institutions, improve capacities of stakeholders and enable them to launch programs and 
activities over the next five years, these include” (NDMA, 2009, p. vi): 
 Institutional and Legal Arrangements for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) 
 Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment 
 Training, Education, and Awareness 
 Disaster Risk Management Planning 
 Community and Local Level Programming 
 Multi-hazard Early Warning System 
 Main Streaming Disaster Risk Reduction into Development 
 Emergency Response System 
 Capacity Development for Post-Disaster Recovery 
 
The NDMA annual report of 2007–2008 also highlights that NDMA “initiated the 
National Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management (NCBDRM) project” 
(NDMA, 2009, p. vi). This project focused on the development of the nine areas 
previously mentioned. The agency also focused on stockpiling at critical places and on 
preparation of contingency plans. In addition, it acted as the lead agency in this five-year 
period after the establishment of NDMA it responded to the disasters such as flash floods 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern areas. The NDMA has also assisted internally 
displaced persons of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, supported Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas, and responded to the earthquake of Baluchistan. The report also highlights the 
support NDMA extended to foreign countries hit by natural disasters. NDMA also 
prepositioned stockpiles of relief items at five hubs in Islamabad, Karachi, Rawalpindi, 
Lahore, and Quetta. To integrate civil service officers as part of the disaster relief effort, 
NDMA launched a special training initiative by offering to develop course material for 
Disaster Risk Management. It also conducted a two-day simulation on Emergency 
Response Management for officers at the Civil Services Academy, which has since 
become a permanent feature (NDMA, 2009). The training is based on the model of the 
disaster management cycle  shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  NDMA Disaster Management Cycle. Source: NDMA (2009, p. viii). 
In the preceding sections, we have described three individual relief operations that 
happened in the same time frame but differed from one another. They differed not only in 
the nature of operation and the actors involved in carrying out the operation, but also in 
magnitude, demography of affected populations, and geography. To understand and 
analyze these operations, we have to see them as a group and see what we can deduce 
from the information available to us from these events and from the lessons learned. 
2. Hurricane Katrina 2005 – Problem Areas Identified  
President George W. Bush stated in his speech to the nation on September 16, 
2005: 
Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, the United States military, the National Guard, 
Homeland Security, and state and local governments performed skillfully 
under the worst conditions. Yet the system, at every level of government, 
was not well coordinated and was overwhelmed in the first few days. 
(Excerpt of 2006 Speech by U.S. President George W. Bush, as cited by 
Clayton, 2006). 
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The National Guard, an important element of the military, is at the disposal of 
state government in a crisis situation and is sufficiently equipped with resources 
equivalent to active duty military (Buddelmeyer, 2007). Moreover, guardsmen have links 
with communities and are well aware of local areas and conditions. However, due to lack 
of preparedness during peace times and an inadequate forecast from FEMA, the National 
Guard did not have effective pre-positioning of resources and responsiveness to the 
disaster (Samaan & Verneuil, n.d.). Major Kevin L. Buddelmeyer mentions in his report 
(2007) that U.S. NORTHCOM started the coordination procedures even prior to 
Katrina’s first landfall. However, the confusing procedure and framework requirement 
kept the military away from responding in the initial phase of Katrina.  
A report on the preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina formulated by 
the U.S. House of Representatives (2006) notes that the military played an important role 
in relief efforts; however, coordination was lacking. The report highlights that once active 
military troops are called to participate in domestic disaster relief, they operate under the 
chain of command of the federal government. By contrast, the other military element, the 
National Guard, was deployed under the state government command mechanism. The 
dual command structure leads to coordination issues in relief operations (Buddelmeyer, 
2007). Major Buddlemeyer recalls that there were a number of occasions when active 
military troops and national guardsmen were assigned the same area of operation for 
relief activities. This situation affects efficient use of resources, lacks situational 
awareness, and degrades a unified disaster response (Buddelmeyer, 2007).  
Lack of integration among military and federal agencies, as discussed in the 
ensuing paragraphs, presents a major challenge. DHS was established after 9/11 to create 
synergy among federal agencies involved in mitigating domestic emergencies. In 
addition, U.S. NORTHCOM can also be raised to manage the federal military response to 
any domestic incident or disaster. The congressional report on the response to Hurricane 
Katrina shows, however, that despite their overlapping roles in domestic emergencies, 
“Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or 
adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding 
and trust during the Katrina response” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, p. 221). The 
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report also notes that the DOD, state and local authorities, and federal agencies failed to 
actively participate in joint planning, which leads to delayed response. 
Similarly, in discussing the NGOs’ coordination with federal agencies, the same 
congressional report  mentions that NGOs, particularly the American Red Cross, faced 
significant breakdowns in coordination with FEMA, particularly. FEMA did not respond 
to their support requests and was unsuccessful in evacuation of those in need.  
Another reason for the delayed response to Katrina and lack of coordination 
among government actors, the report indicates, is the lengthy process of calling active 
military for domestic emergency and an unclear framework. The report highlights that 
National Response Plan (NRP) was a source of confusion in initiating the process to call 
for active military in the relief operation. State government representatives kept asking 
for military support once state level capability was overwhelmed, and the delayed 
response was compounded by the federal government’s delayed decision on these 
requests. One of the fundamental flaws highlighted in the U.S. House of Representatives 
report (2006) is that although the NRP acknowledges that local and state capability may 
quickly be overwhelmed by an event, it still assumes that “state/local authorities will be 
able to integrate federal resources into the response efforts” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2006, p. 202).  
The single most frustrating limitation, even four years after 9/11, remained the 
lack of inter-operability and communication/coordination among government 
organizations. The same issue was amplified in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath, where 
local, state, and federal agencies failed to coordinate and communicate for an effective 
joint relief effort. Hurricane Katrina completely disrupted the core communication 
infrastructure in New Orleans and some other areas, impacting local emergency call 
service, telephone service, and broadcast communications, including radio stations and 
television stations (Townsend, 2006). This disruption led to coordination and 
interoperability issues among local, state, federal government agencies and civil 
organizations. The follow-up report of U.S. House of Representatives (2006) on the 
response to Hurricane Katrina notes that  “Massive communications damage and a failure 
to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and 
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situational awareness” (.p 163). Areas where some communication network was still 
intact were useless due to the loss of electricity, and cellular communication towers 
remained operational only for 12 hours when the batteries in the cell towers died. The 
National Guard was not issued with SINCGARS radio, which is used as an emergency 
communication means during disasters. These communication gaps led to a delayed relief 
response (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). Private sector integration with federal 
and military elements was also lacking measures to enhance coordination during the 
relief effort. 
The same congressional report indicates that as per the NRP, the National 
Communication System has the authority to build a communication network at each tier 
in case of an incident that needs a response at the national level. In support of the relief 
operations, the NSC provided 1,000 Government Emergency Telecommunication Service 
and 4,000 Wireless Priority Service lines to the responders and maintained the Shared 
Resources High-Frequency Radio Program, which was shared by 91 organizations and 
431 stations nation-wide.   
To address the unclear and overlapping responsibilities among federal and state 
government agencies, the U.S. House of Representatives (2006) report criticized the NRP 
assumption that federal agencies should become involved only after the state and local 
authorities are overwhelmed. The report asks, “How can we rely on the overwhelmed to 
acknowledge they are overwhelmed, and then expect them to direct and manage the 
process of coming to their rescue?”(p. 15). The same report also provides a Policy 
Coordination Response Framework, which is shown in Figure 19. Since the 
congressional report, the 2004 NRP has been replaced by the National Response 
Framework of 2007, in which the role of FEMA is enhanced as the coordinating agency 
that brings together 49 non-profit private organizations to better integrate the relief 
response (Samaan & Verneuil, n.d.). 
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Figure 19.  Policy Coordination Response Framework. Source: U.S. House of 
Representatives (2006). 
On August 31, the day after the declaration of emergency, FEMA’s Field 
Coordinating Officers organization started functioning in affected states according to the 
2004 NRP. Each Field Coordinating Officer started joint integration operations working 
through local offices with local and state elements as well as private entities. This 
hierarchical flow of information enhanced the coordination among inter-governmental 
agencies, NGOs, and private actors. From NORTHCOM, JF-Katrina, established under 
the command of Lieutenant General Russel Honore, as Defense Coordinating Officer, 
started coordinating the joint operations of active duty troops and the National Guard 
(Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2009). Once the military was called and the National Guard 
recovered, they were joined by the guards from other states, and relief operations started 
getting momentum in all affected areas. Other states and the DOD gradually increased 
their resources as indicated in the Table 7  
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 Detail of National Guardsmen and Active Duty Troops. Source: U.S. Table 7.  
House of Representatives (2006). 
 
 
The aspect of disaster response which is different in the United States as 
compared to most of the countries is the role of the military, rather than a federal or state 
government actor, as the lead agency in the relief operation. Obviously, in peace times, 
inter-governmental coordination takes place at all levels but the contingency environment 
merits special focus because of the higher pace and greater force. NORTHCOM is 
considered to be at the right place to assume the lead role and utilize all resources at the 
federal and state level to formulate a unified relief effort. At this point in the response, 
President Bush said, “it is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal 
authority and a broader role for the armed forces, the institution of our government most 
capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s notice.” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2006, p.14)  
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3. Indonesian Tsunami – 2004 Problem Areas Identified 
The HADR operation in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam provided a 
number of important lessons for all participants. As is widely recognized, the military has 
its own special capabilities, which are distinct from those of civil organizations. These 
capabilities include special means of transportation, airlift capabilities, and medical and 
surgical treatment specialties. Wiharta et al. explain that during this operation the other 
relief organizations did not have a good understanding of the military capabilities and did 
not make use of military assets for transporting the logistics to the affected area (Wiharta 
et al., 2008). Bennet (2006) also highlights the problem of lack of knowledge about the 
military’s capabilities during operation at Aceh, which resulted in major problems while 
coordinating the evacuation of injured people from the affected areas, delivering supplies, 
providing humanitarian aid to the survivors in a short period of time, and removing the 
dead to prevent epidemics in the disaster area (Bennet, 2006). Bennet also highlights the 
coordination issues between the UN agencies and the military during the relief effort that 
stemmed from lack of communication and resulted in failure to provide timely support 
(Bennet, 2006).  
Fragmentation of the relief effort was one of the most important problem areas, 
especially in the initial stage of the operation, as there were a great number of agencies 
on the ground (Bennett, Harkin, Bertrand, Samarasinghe, & Wickramatillake, 2006). Jon 
Bennett, William Bertrand, Clare Harkin, Stanley Samarasinghe & Hermantha 
Wickramatillake  (2006) also point out the problem of responsible reporting and decision 
making at different levels, as it resulted in micromanagement and dependence on New 
York and Geneva (Bennett et al., 2006). There was a need for more centralized 
coordination structure to ensure field coordination among relief agencies, as stated by 
Bennett et al. (2006). The need for a single point of coordination got more pronounced 
once the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) did not have an office in the affected 
area and the committee had to depend on other agencies in the field (Bennett et al., 2006). 
Bennett et al. (2006) also notes that during conferences it was a point of 
contention among agencies about which member would represent them and their point of 
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view; there was an air of dissatisfaction among the members on the quality of meetings 
during the first six months. The report also focuses on the importance of the results the 
meetings achieved, which were minimal; furthermore, attendance at meetings cost the 
smaller NGOs more and were less beneficial for them (Bennett et al., 2006). Bennett et 
al. (2006) also highlight the need for the right priority for the right job, which was not the 
case in this situation and it resulted in miscoordination while designating the talks 
between military and civil organizations. While addressing the issues related to the 
quality of personnel involved in the relief effort Bennett et al. (2006) also point out the 
high turnover rate, as well as lack of trust and confidence, which were serious issues. 
This affected the coordination between civil and military organizations. Francois 
Bourguignon and Jean Philippe Platteau (2015) state that “lack of coordination thus leads 
to excessive donor recruitment of administrators, thus causing unnecessary stress on the 
demand for scarce (staff) resources in the recipient countries” (Bourguignon & Platteau, 
2015, p. 87).  
Philippe Regnier, Bruno Neri, Stefania Scuteri, and Stefano Miniati (2008) 
emphasize the coordination issue and stress that the process gets more complex when the 
region has issues like political and social crises, as we could see in Aceh (Indonesia) 
(Régnier, Neri, Scuteri, & Miniati, 2008); so, this has to be kept in mind while operating 
in such areas. Focusing on the civil-military coordination Bennett et al. (2006) point out 
that although the military was used in the relief effort, its particular resources, which 
were vital to the success of the operation and relief effort, were not fully or efficiently 
used because of a lack of information and poor needs assessment. These shortcomings 
also affected the disposition of military assets (Bennett et al., 2006). The international 
community fell short on the strategic planning and correct needs assessment related to the 
shelters provision, which resulted in long delays; permanent housing was not the priority, 
and it became a crisis as highlighted by Bennett et al. (2006). The report also highlights 
that Civil-Military Coordination Officers of UNOCHA “were ill-equipped institutionally 
and technically to undertake this [relief coordination] task” (Bennett et al. 2006,  p. 47).  
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While citing Eye on Aceh (2005), Bennett et al. (2006) highlight the problem of 
gender insensitivity, observing that “in Indonesia, the Provincial Bureau of Women’s 
Empowerment initially had no special plans to address the needs of women, explaining 
that men and women had suffered equally. Later undoubtedly under the influence and 
pressure of international agencies, this view was qualified” (Sec 5.3, Gender Issues, p. 
64).       
a. Measures Taken to Enhance Coordination during Relief Effort 
Clare Harkin (2004) asserts that “civil-military coordination will only work 
effectively if both parties can articulate a coherent view of their respective objectives” 
(Harkin, 2004, p. 4). The Indonesian Government requested assistance from other 
countries due to the massive scale of the disaster in Aceh. A hurdle was the bureaucracy, 
which caused a delay in ordering the mobilization of the military and other organizations 
in response to the tsunami disaster in Aceh (Harkin, 2004). The national government 
delivered ad hoc regulation, allowing the international actors to come in the country to 
provide support, and lifted all barriers to ensure relief to the suppressed community. 
In the initial stage of the operation, as highlighted by Bennett et al. (2006), the 
turnover rate of the relief operators was high but with regulation and long-term contracts, 
this problem was addressed in the latter half of 2005. The report also points out that 
measures like a mechanism to track funds, consolidated mechanisms, and budgetary 
commitments helped improve the monitoring system (Bennett et al., 2006).  
The relief organizations and military depended on the private sector for the 
provision of communication, such as cell phones, satellites, and other communication 
means. Nevertheless, there was no single platform to incorporate all the international 
groups, which affected the quality and flow of information and the relief effort itself 
(Bennett et al., 2006). In the initial six months of the relief effort there was no dialogue 
with the government directly or through representatives of the military with an aim to 
develop a dialog on the issue of protection of civilians, but it improved later with special 
efforts, as highlighted by Bennett et al. (2006). 
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b. Measures Taken after Relief Effort 
Bennett et al. (2006) suggest that the HRR illustrates that UN agencies, the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent, and NGOs have to ensure vertical coordination within their own 
networks and further suggests that collaboration has to be enhanced among them. The 
important aspect highlighted by Bennett et al. (2006) is the availability of funds to 
INGOs and the Red Cross for recovery and emergency, and this privatization of the aid 
made the INGOs more efficient in the relief process. 
B. COORDINATION FACTORS IN SELECTED OPERATIONS 
Table 8 gives an overview of the operations, indicating the impact of each factor 
leading to coordination issues. These factors have been divided into three main 
categories: framework, coordination during operations, and training. Each contributing 
factor has been gauged, based on detailed analysis carried out in previous chapter. Each 
category is now analyzed to draw the common lessons.  









Framework   
Clarity of lead agency High Moderate Low 
Communication with support 
agencies Moderate High Low 
Joint exercises and training 
needs Low Moderate Low 
Hierarchical chain of 
command Moderate High Low 
Capacity development Low Moderate Low 
Communication/
Coordination        
Communication network Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Sharing of information Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Sharing of resources High Moderate Moderate 
Transportation of evacuees High Moderate Moderate 
Meetings/conferences Moderate Low Low 










knowledge Moderate Moderate Low 
Inter-organizational mutual 
trust Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Training       
Joint training Low Moderate Low 
Joint exercises Low Moderate Low 
Joint planning Low Moderate Low 
Joint courses Moderate Moderate Low 
 
a. Frameworks  
The aim of having a framework is to guide a course of action, instead of devising 
a new plan at the time of each new emergency. A comprehensive framework is an 
important document that influences the response of all stakeholders and contributes to a 
unified and coordinated operation in the shortest time. Unlike the United States, Pakistan 
and Indonesia at the time of the disasters analyzed in this study did not have a framework 
to guide the relief effort participants. However, Pakistan’s military as the lead responder 
in disaster and complex emergency situations was considered as lead agency to 
coordinate the relief operation in 2005. If we evaluate the factors under framework in 
Table 8, we see the need for joint training and exercises and the capacity development 
factors are the problem areas that need to be addressed in the framework.  
In the case of the 2004 NRP, emphasis was, in fact, placed on joint exercises and 
capacity building; however, senior leadership failed to commit adequate resources for 
these factors. As mentioned in the U.S. House of Representatives report (2006), just prior 
to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, a hurricane Pam exercise was conducted to understand 
the impact of a high category cyclone in cities which were below the sea level. Because 
funds were not available, though, the recommendations from that exercise were not given 
priority. Joint training and exercises provide an opportunity to establish relations among 
participants, which can prove vital during joint relief operations. Moreover, such forums 
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can help participants in understanding the roles and responsibilities of other agencies and 
bring up the on-ground issues faced during the operations.  
Capacity development is mainly achieved by decentralizing the role of response 
actors for better management and execution of plan. In the case of the Pakistan 
earthquake, required machinery and other  equipment was unavailable, and many lives 
were lost. This emphasis in the framework will allow relevant government agencies to 
allocate sufficient resources to develop the capacity of support agencies and to integrate 
them into joint tasks to bring clarity to their role and capacity.  
b. Communication and Coordination during Execution 
This category consists of factors directly linked to coordination during execution 
of relief operations. Table 8 indicates that interactions among players in meetings and 
conferences during the relief operations following Hurricane Katrina in the United States 
and the tsunami in Indonesia was low, which makes the overall grading of this factor low. 
The practice of holding regular meetings and conferences by lead agency during the 
operations allows breaking of communication barriers among organizations; sharing of 
information, real time issues, and distribution of resources; and mitigating those issues 
with collective wisdom. There were occasions during the tsunami response effort when 
relief agency and NGO representatives were not attending periodic meetings, which 
resulted in a lack of coordination and wasteful duplication of effort. The other gray area 
in this category is inter-organizational functional knowledge, which got an overall grade 
of low for all three operations. This factor adds to external challenges faced by relief 
agencies. This shortcoming can be mitigated through more interactions during an 
operation; e.g., by meetings/conferences, joint operations, and mutual collaboration. In 
addition, emphasis on organizational integration, joint training and exercises, and joint 




Out of the three categories mapped on Table 8, training has emerged as the 
grayest area that can contribute to improving inter-agency as well as civil-military 
coordination. Thus, it needs to be emphasized in the framework so that adequate 
frequency of such training and exercises is conducted throughout the year. These training 
programs and exercises need to be planned with an aim to refine standard operating 
procedures for relief efforts, and to gain a better understanding of needs assessments in 
different disaster situations as well as to explore ways to improve coordination in the 
disaster theater. All such training and exercises will only prove beneficial and produce 
results when all inter-governmental agencies, military components, and NGOs actively 
take part in these programs. Internationally, UNOCHA is focusing on improving inter-
agency coordination in joint relief operations by offering a number of training programs 
and collaboration opportunities in the form of workshops, conferences, and post-mission 
reviews. These training forums are mostly attended by NGOs and a few governmental 
agencies. There is a need to engage lead agencies of countries to actively participate in 
such training programs to establish one-to-one relations with INGOs and know what new 
trends are emerging to mitigate HADR challenges. Inter-Organizational Culture 
One of the most influential barriers to inter-organizational coordination is the 
unique culture of every organization working in HADR operations. The diversity in relief 
actors poses a greater challenge to coordination and collaboration of those working side-
by-side in one theater. Broadly we have discussed two major actors as the humanitarian 
community and the militaries. Nonetheless, within the humanitarian community itself, 
government organizations, international and local NGOs, and private entities are different 
from each other and their own methods and structures. Generally, NGOs follow a 
functional structure in which decision making is decentralized as compared to 
governmental organizations that follow a mixed structure, adding a number of checks and 
balances and adhering to rules and regulations. Therefore, as compared to governmental 
organizations, NGOs enjoy greater autonomy in decision making and operations. In the 
case of military actors, however, which include HN military and other foreign militaries, 
they follow a hierarchical chain of command in which decision making takes place 
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centrally at a high level and strictly in accordance with the rules of engagement. To 
overcome these differences and constraints and to maximize coordination in joint 
operations, lead agencies must include appropriate representatives from participating 
relief organizations in joint planning and integration, and all actors must engage in joint 
training and exercises.    
As our analysis reveals, the lack of coordination and its resulting inefficiencies in 
relief efforts stem from shortcomings in leadership. Although the 2004 NRP amply 
defined the role of FEMA and state and local governments along with other support 
agencies, for example, it provided no clear guidance on which actor should take the lead 
role, leaving that decision subject to the extent and magnitude of the disaster. 
Furthermore, no guidance is provided for undertaking such an assessment of the 
magnitude of a disaster that would determine whether to shift the leadership 
responsibility from state and local government to the federal government. 
C. PHASES OF HADR OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION OF THE 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
Figure 20 depicts an inter-agency relationship during an activity as it occurs over 
time. The figure also shows the phases of operation and coordination in this inter-agency 
relationship. In the initial phase of the operation the most important task of the relief 
worker is the rescue effort, which is shown by a largest parabola. This is the phase in 
which the military is the first responder, bringing with it large resources that can help 
supplement the rescue effort. 
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Figure 20.  Phases of HADR Operation and Coordination Relationship. Adapted 
from Haas et al. (1977), as cited by Heaslip and Barber (2016). 
In the Rescue Phase, the first actors to react to a disaster are the locals from the 
affected community, and who have survived the initial impact. They are the ones who 
require the capacity to carry out the rescue work until external help arrives. Furthermore, 
the local people must be trained in basic first aid and rescue procedures to cover this gap. 
This is a high activity time as shown by point-A on the parabola in Figure 20; it is the 
time when the greatest influx of support arrives after the magnitude of the disaster has 
been assessed. The military of the HN reacts first, after any NGOs and INGOs that are 
already in the area. These civil organizations may have their warehouses and forward 
stockpiles in those areas and will start supporting the population. It is essential for these 
organizations to keep the stockpiles out of the area that is likely to be the disaster zone. 
Having the most resources at its disposal, the military can react first and reach the 
affected area to carry out the initial rescue. It is crucial to undertake the rescue effort 
immediately to save as many lives as possible as life expectancy falls with every passing 
day. This is the phase in which camps are also established and the survivors are shifted to 
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those camps. We can see by the graph that activity is rising during this phase and then it 
starts dropping and transforms into a restoration phase. 
The restoration phase is the one in which the remediation and rebuilding process 
starts. This phase is supported by the local government, and in accordance with the 
magnitude of the damage, the external players may also play important part in this phase. 
This phase has less activity as compared to the rescue phase, but these two overlap each 
other (point-B) once the major part of the population has been rescued. In this phase the 
local and international NGOs also start coming in, and in some cases, the foreign 
militaries also join the relief operation. This is the point where the major coordination 
phase starts. It is a complex process as it involves coordination among different 
organizations with distinct cultures, as has been explained in the preceding chapters. This 
is the phase in which we can see that the military activities are falling and civil 
organizations activities are rising, as shown by points C and D, respectively.   
We can see that the intersection point is point E. That point indicates that the role 
of the military is less prominent than the role played by the civil organizations. We would 
like to recommend that in countries where the army is the lead agency, this is the point 
where the responsibility for the conduct of operation should shift to the civil 
organizations, under the supervision and control of the HN. The area shown in the green 
triangle (area F) is the Inter-Agency Coordination triangle, which spans all stages of the 
operation and needs more detailed coordination. We can also see from the figure that the 
phase during which most coordination is required is the rebuilding stage.  
Now we can see this whole process from another point of view also. Earlier we 
discussed the aim of analyzing different operations, from different countries, in almost 
the same time frame to discern impact of the civil-military relationship on the relief 
effort. We have presented the facts about the operations in Chapter III, and here we see 
what the impact of that relationship is on the relief effort. Figure 20 highlights the 
relationship at different stages and with varying levels of involvement of civil relief 
organizations and military.  
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D. MILITARY CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES ANALYSIS 
The increased number of disasters in this century, as has been explained in 
previous chapters, has resulted in an increased number of troops contributing in the 
disaster-response operations. The operations focused on in Chapter III provide our 
research base; so are analyzing the military’s role in these operations from 1997 to 2006. 
A 2008 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) covers countries that 
contributed assets to the International Disaster Relief Assistance (IDRA), a summary of 
the same is compiled in Table 9 for ease of understanding and to bring out pertinent 
lessons (Wiharta, Ahmad, Haine, Lofgren, & Randall, 2008) from the SIPRI report. 
 Countries’ Contributions to International Disaster Relief Assistance. Table 9.  
Adapted from Wiharta et al. (2008, pp. 12–15). 
Countries/ 
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With this analysis we can discern which countries are the most active in this 
contribution. The major contributions are in the field of “communications, engineering, 
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medical support, power supply and distribution, search and rescue, transport, logistics 
and coordination, (air: transport, logistics and coordination) road and rail; transport, 
logistics and coordination – sea and inland water; and water and sanitation” (Wiharta et 
al., 2008, p. 15). Wiharta et al. also mention that Canada, Japan, Netherlands, and the UK 
were the countries that coordinated with the SIPRI organization and furnished them with 
full data. As a result, this comparison of troop contributions per year was created 
(Wiharta et al., 2008, pp. 14–15) and is shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21.  Annual Number of Deployments Reported by Countries Deployed, 
1997–2006. Adapted from Wiharta et al. (2008, p. 15). 
As Figure 21 clearly indicates, some countries contribute their militaries to other 
countries frequently in disaster relief operations. Clearly, these militaries must have 
special training and knowledge to work effectively with their counterparts in these 
operations. Wiharta et al. (2008) also point out that China, North Korea, and India are 
countries that do not accept IDRA support and do not allow foreign militaries on their 
soil (Wiharta et al., 2008). Nevertheless, they do contribute troops for IDRA in other 
countries, which makes it necessary for them to enhance their skills in joint training, 











E. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND USE OF MILITARY 
RESOURCES  
An important factor that we have analyzed is the distribution of tasks in multi-
actor relief efforts. When task distribution was poorly coordinated, it resulted in poor 
performance or in non-availability of relief goods. In their report, Wiharta et al. (2008) 
quote a Canadian contingent composed of engineers who were tasked with providing 
potable water. The task was done in a most professional way, but due to the difference in 
mandate and non-distribution of responsibility, the water did not reach the affected 
population and the task for delivering was not assigned to anyone else (Wiharta et al., 
2008). If these points would have been addressed at the appropriate time, the outcome 
would have been much better.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE FRAMEWORK 
In light of our analysis of the literature available on the topic, and on the data we 
collected and examined in previous chapters on selected countries’ disaster frameworks 
and operations, we are recommending a framework to enhance coordination among the 
civil and military organizations in HADR operations. Given the scope of this study, we 
are recommending a coordination framework that should not have any impact on the 
structure of the individual countries’ disaster management authorities. Furthermore, for 
situations requiring an international response, we assume the protocols in place for the 
HN to request external support will likely stay the same and the role of the respective 
ambassadors and staff in the chain will remain of paramount importance. The 
recommended framework is intended to highlight the measures and steps to be taken to 
ensure better inter-agency coordination with an aim to produce better results in disaster 
relief operations. Specifically, we are focusing on the on-ground coordination between 
the military of the HN, foreign support civil elements, and the foreign military 
component. 
Our recommended framework is essentially composed of a series of interrelated 
activities that contribute to strengthening the relationship of humanitarian and military 
partners in disaster relief operations by integrating their efforts. To achieve this, we assert 
that first these actors should develop some familiarity with each other’s organizational 
structure to identify similarities in the relief activities they perform and the processes by 
which they perform these activities. This familiarization task should initially be 
undertaken, in particular, by the leading NGOs of humanitarian relief. Our framework 
provides guidance for how this task can be accomplished by joint conferences, 
identifying and conducting joint exercises, training, planning, and offering courses, and 
examining civil-military relations; the same should be encouraged in educational 
institutions (Fitz & Walthall, 2001, pp.1–7; cited by Abiew, 2003, p. 34). Ultimately, the 
goal of a strengthened civil-military relationship in disaster-response efforts is greater 
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coordination as this is the factor, which if enhanced, can reduce the suffering of the 
disaster’s survivors.  
Figure 22 depicts the recommended coordination framework, including key 
factors to improve coordination among participating organizations in the disaster theater. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Recommended Coordination Framework. 
1. Concept of the Coordination Framework 
This framework is based on the HN and the actors most likely to participate in the 
relief effort, whether they are from inside the affected country or are invited by the HN 
after a sudden onset disaster has occurred. Depending on the extent and magnitude of the 
disaster, in the case that the HN is not overwhelmed, it is strongly recommended that all 
countries establish their own Disaster Management Authorities, which should act as the 
lead agency in case of a disaster. If the HN infrastructure is overwhelmed then members 
of the biggest organization should take over the role of lead agency. In the recommended 
coordination framework, we have kept the HN as the lead agency as a focal point in the 
coordination network. As a lead agency, the HN has to carry out the needs assessment, 
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and the HN must have contingency planning in place to dictate the response by in-
country organizations and international actors.  
The  regional and international government-to-government cooperation in the 
field of mutual economic, security and cultural interests also ensures the cooperation in 
the field of relief effort. According to Major General Asghar Nawaz, Director General of 
the NDMA in Pakistan (in his questionnaire response to the authors), “at regional level 
SAARC countries have also formulated and validated guidelines with regards to dealing 
with any disaster, if and when a disaster happens in any of the SAARC country.” We 
recommend that there should be strategic alliances sponsored by the respective disaster 
lead agencies. Such alliance should focus only on the disaster response and should 
include disaster agencies of other countries, military, and local/international 
organizations. The lead agency for the disaster response needs to develop, manage, and 
collaborate with the network of response organizations in the alliance, keeping in view 
the capabilities, resources, as well as possible disaster threats and destruction. The lead 
agency should sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with participating 
organizations of the strategic alliance and keep the United Nations informed in order to 
standardize the framework. This MOU should spell out and standardize the equipment, 
manpower, support elements, and so forth that each country or organization will 
contribute once it is called upon by the sponsored lead agency of a country. The key task 
of a strategic alliance is to formulate a response plan with participants, and to spell out 
the sharing of resources and level of participation in anticipation of destruction in a 
disaster. This MOU ensure the right degree of participation by organizations and pooling 
of resources, which will help in generating a unified response. The response plan devised 
by the strategic alliance should clearly cover following: 
 Manpower details – according to the role designated and mutually agreed 
upon by all the members.  
 Equipment details – kind of transport, communication, medical support, 
weapons (if any), recovery equipment, engineering elements, helicopters, 
mobile medical units, etc. 
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 Supporting goods – such as water, food, sanitation equipment and shelters, 
water purifiers, etc.  
The HN will know from the MOU, which member will play what role in relief, 
and the HN will be able to direct requests appropriately to specific countries and 
organizations based on the needs assessment that it has carried out. This will economize 
the effort and reduce the load on the supporting countries and organizations as they will 
know exactly what is needed, will be able to divert funds in the right direction, and will 
ensure economy of resources.  
The framework also assumes the need to maintain a Joint Operations Center 
(JOC) at the disaster management authority. The JOC will be disaster specific; so if there 
are two disasters, there will be two JOCs. The JOC serves as the communication hub, and 
each JOC will also have a Forward JOC, which will be established near the disaster 
zone(s) for field coordination.  
2. Common Frameworks 
It is recommended that every disaster response follow a standardized framework 
based on UNOCHA guidelines and that all the countries adopt the same framework. It 
will provide a common platform, common knowledge base, and similar action plans. The 
other option is that each strategic alliance group should have its own common framework 
and should share it with UNOCHA for knowledge and to create a central framework in 
future. Following are the major frameworks and guidelines that need to be standardized 
to act as a bridge once different organizations and nations or their armies come together 
during any humanitarian operation.   
a. Communication Network Interface 
We have come to the conclusion that communication is one of the biggest 
challenges in any of the humanitarian relief operation. This single factor, if enhanced, 
helps to overcome many difficulties. Direct communication with multiple means is very 
important. Two measures must be implemented to ensure effective communication: first, 
there is a need to  standardize the communication equipment and this should be addressed 
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in the MOU; secondly, there is a need to ensure that all countries bring in compatible 
communication equipment. Furthermore, they should have multiple means of compatible 
communication capable of being integrated easily within one large communication 
network. The system has to be multi-layered with multiple means of communication to 
ensure free flow of information at all times. It should have pre-arranged network and 
communication diagrams, call signs, identification signs, passwords, code words, and 
nicknames. This task of preparation of network and communication diagrams, 
nicknames, and code words can be given to the military as they are good at it.  
These measures will ensure an uninterrupted flow of information. They will also 
ensure that same information is available to all participating in the relief operation. The 
HN and the countries of the strategic alliance should also maintain a pool of interpreters 
for instances in which they are operating in a non-English speaking country.  
b. Common Standard Operating Procedures and Operational Framework  
At present each country and organization has its own methods and procedures for 
operating in disasters, but these should be standardized as much as possible so that each 
member of a relief effort, regardless of the country or organization, will have same 
procedures and priorities, taking into account their distinct role. These methods and 
procedures can encompass the following: 
 Search and rescue 
 Evacuation  
 Priority of relief goods distribution 
 Sanitation and health  
 Camp establishment and management 
 Interaction with civilians and military component of HN and international 
actors 
 Transportation of relief workers  
 Transportation of casualties 
 Protection of children and women 
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c. Knowledge of Capabilities 
We have noticed during our research that the lack of knowledge of capabilities 
results in underutilization of resources and weak relief effort. The initiatives of the 
strategic alliance and the signing of an MOU with the details mentioned earlier will 
ensure that each member country knows the equipment, workforce, and expertise that 
each member is contributing. It will help in the utilization of the assets of every relief 
component to the best of its capabilities. This knowledge base has to be as detailed as 
possible. Each item of relief being brought in has to be explained fully so that the HN 
knows exactly what it is requesting.  
d. Clear Distribution of Responsibility 
We have seen that due to the poor distribution of tasks and lack of clarity 
regarding roles and responsibilities sometimes the relief goods may arrive too late or may 
not reach disaster victims at all. These clear frameworks have to distribute the 
responsibilities among all the relief organizations, which should have a primary and a 
secondary role to play in case of a disaster. And, these roles should be known to all the 
countries and organizations in peace time so that they practice accordingly during the 
mock exercises. It will not only help them identify any bottlenecks in the process but will 
also help other supporting organizations to get familiar with their respective roles. 
Furthermore, it can also ensure non-duplication of effort.  
Bennett et al. (2006) explain that UNOCHA has taken the initiative to formulate 
the principles for the use of international militaries and their assets in support of relief 
operations in all kind of disasters and emergencies, which are duly approved by the IASC 
(Bennett et al., 2006). Effort should be made to publicize these principles and to ensure 
that these are known to all across the board, whether they are NGOs, militaries, or 
government agencies, to promote more effective coordination (Bennett et al., 2006). 
Bennett et al. (2006) also recommend review of the IASC statement on the role of the 
military in emergencies. The report recommends that, “At the very least the IASC should 
consider replacing the ‘in the last resort’ caveat included in the Oslo and Military and 
Civil Defense Assets Guidelines with ‘in exceptional circumstances’, which would better 
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reflect the need for such rapid response” (Bennett et al., 2006, p. 52, citing from point 4.2 
‘Civil-military relationship.’) We should make use of these principles while formulating 
our framework so that it has an interface with the UNOCHA and IASC.  
e. Framework for Conferences 
We recommend further having a framework for specific conferences. During our 
analysis of operations, we concluded that this platform, which is supposed to be the main 
source of sharing information, has not been used effectively. Organizations lose interest 
in these conferences as they do not believe that the substance of these conferences makes 
any difference during relief operations. This belief is even more common among small 
organizations. To enhance the outcome of meetings, during pre-deployment training, staff 
should receive instruction on and practice conducting meetings and making them more 
fruitful. There should be standard operating procedures for conducting a regular 
conference or meetings during relief operations that should be adopted by all 
stakeholders. In light of our analysis, we recommend the following must be ensured: 
 An introductory conference should be held to introduce all the relief 
organizations and countries, and to review the rules of conferences. 
 The conference agenda has to be distributed in advance to all members or 
all organizations participating in the relief effort. 
 The members and organizations participating in the relief effort should be 
notified as to who will chair the conference and what the contingency plan 
is also. 
 The schedule and sequence of conferences to be held should be known to 
all participants in advance. 
 The number of scheduled conferences should be kept to a minimum. 
 Organizations and countries should be invited to add their concerns to the 
agenda. 
 Minutes should be kept of each conference, including clearly detailed 
action items and who is responsible for addressing each one and for 
following up on their accomplishment. 
 All participants must be kept informed of the progress on the action items 
and points decided in the previous conference. 
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Well organized and interactive conferences that welcome the input of all 
participants will enhance the confidence of all the members and will encourage them to 
attend the meetings once they know that the decisions taken are also implemented.  
f. Cultural Framework 
The research clearly indicates that cultural differences among countries as well as 
among organizationseven among those from the same countrycan cause gaps in the 
coordination of relief efforts. We need to bridge these gaps by closer interactions and 
more joint training. Here we would like to recommend that a cultural framework be 
prepared and made readily available to all in the relief effort. This cultural framework 
should clearly identify the different organizational hierarchies, appointments, roles or 
fields of responsibility for each appointment, protocols, and salient characteristics of their 
culture. This reference tool should also be visible during joint planning and exercises. 
Such a resource can help to address many issues related to interaction and protocols. We 
also recommend that a common cultural framework should be thoroughly documented, 
clearly defining hierarchical organizational status, its size, areas of expertise, and norms 
of interaction, along with professional and multicultural etiquette. .”  
g. Joint Training and Planning 
It is recommended that enhanced joint training should be undertaken. It will 
improve the coordination by promoting the understanding of one another’s organizational 
roles, capabilities, and working procedures. Joint training should encompass the 
following areas: 
 (1) Host Nation (HN) Peace Time Training 
Each country that is part of the strategic alliance should hold training events, 
courses, and exercises. The concept is to invite the key personnel of each organization 
and the military components with an aim to conduct a joint exercise or training, which 
should be jointly funded by each country taking part or by the host nation. Subject 
training should also have observers from UN, UNOCHA, NATO, or other organizations 
that are not part of the strategic alliance, so that they can also take the lessons from 
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training back to their institutions. It will help these organizations understand the 
functioning and frameworks of the strategic alliance countries, and when the magnitude 
of a disaster goes beyond the capability of the alliance, these observer organizations will 
be the ones reacting to the request of the HN, and they will have the knowledge of the 
country and the framework in place.  
 (2) Joint Courses 
Human aid and disaster relief courses should be conducted regularly and 
invitations to attend should be extended to experts and students who will be working 
members of the respective National Disaster Management Authorities or organizations 
and the strategic alliance. Furthermore, each country or organization should identify in 
which area of the disaster management field it has its greatest strengths and it should 
share that knowledge with other members of the alliance in peace time to better prepare 
for the response. This should be done on the principle of Train the Trainers, whereby 
these selected individuals should be trained and they in turn should train their respective 
country teams on the subject expertise. This will also help in capacity building and will 
enhance reaction capabilities. The courses should not only focus on post-disaster events 
but on pre-disaster activities and planning also.  
h. Joint Exercises 
Joint exercises are important and should be made a permanent feature. We 
recommend adopting a three-year plan for joint exercises, which should be mutually 
decided upon. The disaster management agencies of each country should identify the 
Problem areas and then should plan the exercises addressing those grey areas. The three-
year plan should be known to each member and all countries and organizations should 
contribute for the conduct of same. Clear responsibility for each exercise should be given 
to each country or organization. These exercises can be event specific. For example, a 
country that is likely to be hit by an earthquake or a flood may choose to develop an 
exercise in that country focused on a relief operation tailored to that particular disaster 
and its aftermath, while all others participate. NGOs also have an important role in this 
type of training, this training will integrate them with their counter parts and will be able 
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to perform better. These exercises will help enhance the capacity, expertise, and 
knowledge of each participant and its appreciation for the culture and capacity of its 
partners in disaster relief efforts.  
i. Joint Planning 
Strategic alliance countries should carry out joint planning for likely disasters. 
The process will be facilitated once a common framework, as discussed in a previous 
point, is in place. Joint planning will give an HN more lead time for the whole process if 
the HN faces any kind of disaster. For joint planning to be most effective, we recommend 
that the ambassadors of the strategic alliance countries should be taken onboard, along 
with all the strategic alliance actors. The plans should be categorized according to the 
likely disasters and their magnitude. Such plans should clearly indicate responsibility, 
equipment required as per the magnitude, relief goods needed, and so forth, It will help in 
contingency planning. These plans will be based on the likely needs assessment for which 
the previous disasters in those regions can act as a base for this pre-disaster planning. The 
plans should also take into account the sudden onset and slow onset disasters as the 
training and preparation will be different in both cases.  
j. Liaison Officers 
It is recommended that the Liaison Officers play a major role to enhance 
coordination. These officers will have to have the special skills, such as technical 
proficiency in a foreign language, if not country specific (which is surely preferred), at 
minimum should know English. There are different tiers at which we are recommending 
the incorporation of Liaison Officers as they all have distinct responsibilities to perform. 
This point has been illustrated by the Red Cross, as was confirmed by Mr. Luke 
Backman, director of field and system integration (in his responses in an interview with 
the authors on April 26, 2017). There is a need for other NGOs and relief organizations to 
do the same. The framework suggested here addresses this point. 
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 (1) HN Field Liaison Officers  
These are the Liaison Officers who should be maintained by the country itself in 
potential disaster areas. They can be individuals on the payroll of the respective 
provincial/state or district/county government, or they may be on the payroll of the 
disaster management authority. Another option is having pre-approved and trained 
individuals in reserve who will only be activated and paid at time of a disaster. They 
should be equipped with the requisite skills and knowledge and should be given a means 
of communication as a contingency. They will be the key persons to inform and to 
contact the central control room maintained at the disaster management authority. They 
should also be included in all training activities, and whenever they are activated, they 
should be given the salary as happens in the military with reservists.  
 (2) NGO Liaison Officers  
All NGOs should have their Liaison Officers who should be pre-approved and 
should form part of the central control team at the disaster management authority. This 
individual will be the one who is all most knowledgeable about the field of his 
organization. To further help in bridging the communication gap, this Liaison Officer will 
also have his or her own contact persons as resources in the field and will be of great 
value.  
 (3) Office Liaison Officers  
These are the Liaison Officers that each organization will nominate as the contact 
person from their respective organization. This individual will be available in the 
respective office of the organization rather than in the field and will act as the Liaison 
Officer for that organization. This resource will be more useful for the NGOs as they 
have fieldwork and sometimes it becomes difficult to communicate with them. This 
officer will be the one relaying all messages in the field to the concerned persons. The 
organizations will have to furnish this individual with the necessary information so that 
he can provide the information to the higher office or disaster management cell once 
 108
needed. This role can be assigned to one person or to a group of people, but the office 
will have to be staffed at all times.  
 (4) Host Nation Liaison Officers Pool 
Each country with the strategic alliance must maintain a pool of Liaison Officers. 
These officers are only utilized in case of a disaster or at the time of joint exercises. Once 
the HN initiates a request for external support, these individuals will be activated. The 
Liaison Officers will be assigned to all the organizations that enter the HN for support 
and will assist them in their settlement, movement, and administrative support activities, 
and will act as a link with the disaster management authority. This pool will also be 
maintained according to the needs assessment. This will help in bridging the 
communication gap and will facilitate better coordination in the relief effort.  
All the steps will ensure better coordination of relief efforts and will result in a 
unified response under the unified command of the HN. Furthermore, it is important to 
enhance capacities and maintain a log of the available assets as suggested by Wiharta et 
al. (2008), who recommend that the Military and Civil Defense Assets register 
maintained at UNOCHA also be regularly updated. It will help in quick decision making 
and visibility for the other organizations and will help in knowing capabilities. This 
information sharing will help in better coordination and will result in visibility of one 
another’s assets. It will also ensure better planning, not only by the host country but by 
the troops contributing countries also. Sharing of information  will save the resources, 
expenditures, and duplication of effort also. The same information sharing should be 
done by the strategic alliance countries and organizations as well. 
B. CONCLUSION  
Collaboration is the most important tool that can bring synergy to any aspect of 
the disaster response operation. We have tried to highlight the important shortcomings in 
collaboration and coordination in such operations by focusing on not only the present 
frameworks but also the selected three operations. We have proposed a framework along 
with recommendations to enhance coordination. The need for improvement in this area 
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can only be witnessed by close collaboration among national institutions and 
organizations but also with the international community.  
Madiwale and Virk (2011) appreciate the relief efforts made during the 2005 
earthquake in Pakistan and cite it as a success. They also point out that this military-led 
operation, which featured the largest humanitarian helicopter airlift that reached even the 
most inaccessible and remote areas, was the result of an effective coordination. 
Furthermore, while they commended the role of Pakistan’s military in the operation, they 
also touched on the specific issue we address in this study, noting, “the experience helped 
build trust between the humanitarian community and the Pakistan military and 
established the military as a primary and effective response to natural disasters, but it also 
highlighted the need for more effective civil-military co-ordination” (p. 1090). The 
operations that we have discussed in the thesis have their commonalities and differences, 
but we can easily conclude that the results of each operation could have been much better 
if there was a more coordinated effort.  
We hope that further development takes place in the field of joint planning, 
training, and exercises, and through more interaction among all players, which will show 
in the results of responses to future challenging situations.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
No study is ever complete, and as a result of research, new questions arise that 
need to be answered in future studies. Based on some of the questions raised by our own 
research that fell beyond the scope of this present study, we would like to suggest the 
following areas for further research: 
 Development of a common communication network, recommending 
communication means and equipment along with the communication 
protocols.  
 Preparation of a joint training and planning framework. 
 Preparation of a handbook for field officers, detailing all the relief effort 
participants, their capabilities, organizational structures, and relevant 
cultural considerations for the region of operation. This handbook should 
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also standardize the relief equipment so that all have one baseline to 
follow, and it should also facilitate the communication.  
 Identification of the strong points of different nations contributing to 
disaster response operations. 
 Cost estimation for the host nations planning to conduct a joint training. 
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APPENDIX A.  FEMA CRITERIA TO PROVIDE 
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 
U.S. Federal disaster law does not take into account an arithmetical formula or 
other criteria to decide eligibility for federal assistance in case of a disaster event. FEMA 
takes input from local, state, and civil organizations and considers media reports along 
with a number of factors to determine the severity, magnitude, and impact of a disaster 
(FEMA, 2013). According to FEMA guidelines, the following are some of the primary 
factors it uses to assess disaster events: 
 Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed or with major damage). 
 Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or critical facilities. 
 Imminent threats to public health and safety. 
 Impacts to essential government services and functions. 
 Unique capability of federal government. 
 Dispersion or concentration of damage. 
 Level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners and public  facilities. 
 Available assistance from other sources (federal, state, local, volunteer 
organizations). 
 State and local resource commitments from previous, undeclared events. 
 Frequency of disaster events over recent time period. (FEMA, 2013) 
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APPENDIX B.  ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT  
In the United States, state governments play a lead role to coordinate relief 
operation at the state level, and utilize their own resources, while local governments 
establish a relationship with local communities and private sector, develop capacity and 
framework to mitigate challenges and reduce friction during humanitarian response. 
According to FEMA, the responsibilities of state and local governments are as follows: 
State Governments: 
 Coordinate state resources and provide the strategic guidance needed to 
prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents of all 
types. In accordance with state law, may be able to make, amend, or suspend 
certain orders or regulations associated with response.  
 Communicate to the public and help people, businesses, and organizations 
cope with the consequences of any type of incident.  
 Command the state military forces (National Guard personnel not in federal 
service and state militias).  
 Coordinate assistance from other states through interstate mutual aid and 
assistance compacts, such as the emergency management assistance compact.  
 Request federal assistance including, if appropriate, a Stafford Act 
presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster, when it becomes 
clear that state capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded. 
 Coordinate with impacted tribal governments within the state and initiate 
requests for a Stafford Act presidential declaration of an emergency or major 
disaster on behalf of an impacted tribe when appropriate. 
Local Governments 
 Establish strong working relationships with local jurisdictional leaders and 
core private-sector organizations, voluntary agencies, and community 
partners. The objective is to establish relationships, coordinate, and train with 
local partners in advance of an incident and to develop mutual aid and/or 
assistance agreements for support in response to an incident.  
 Lead and encourage local leaders to focus on preparedness by participating in 
planning, training, and exercises.  
 Support participation in local mitigation efforts within the jurisdiction 
including, as appropriate, the private sector.  
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 Understand and implement laws and regulations that support emergency 
management and response.  
 Ensure that local emergency plans take into account the needs of: the 




APPENDIX C.  PAKISTAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATION  
The National Disaster Management System for Pakistan Act (NDMSPA) of 2010 
provides an effective and comprehensive national disaster management that covers all 
tiers, including the national level, such as NDMC and NDMA; provincial level, PDMA; 
and district level, DDMA. It unifies the response to emergencies. According to NDMSA 
2010, all levels of authorities have a role and responsibility as follows:   
National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) 
 Lay down policies on disaster management 
 Approve the National Plan 
 Approve plans prepared by the Ministers or Divisions of the Federal 
Government in accordance with the National Plan 
 Lay down guidelines to be followed by the Federal Government and 
Provincial Authorities 
  Arrange for, and oversee, the provision of funds for the purpose of mitigation 
measures, preparedness and responses 
 Provide such support to other countries affected by major disasters as Federal 
Government may determine, and 
 Take such other measures for the prevention of disaster or the mitigation or 
for preparedness and capacity building for dealing with disaster situation as it 
may consider necessary. (NA, 2010) 
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) 
 Act as the implementing, coordinating, and monitoring body for disaster 
management. 
 Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National Commission. 
 Implement, co-ordinate, and monitor the implementation of the national 
policy. 
 Lay down guidelines for preparing disaster management plans by different 
Ministries or Departments and the Provincial Authorities. 
 Provide necessary technical assistance to the Provincial Governments and the 
Provincial Authorities for preparing their disaster management plans in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Commission. 
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 Co-ordinate response in the event of any threatening disaster situation or 
disaster. 
 Lay down guidelines for or give directions to the concerned Ministries or 
Provincial Government and the Provincial Authorities regarding measures to 
be taken by them in response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster. 
 For any specific purpose or for general assistance requisition the services of 
any person and such person shall be a co-opted member and exercise such 
power as conferred upon him by the Authority in writing. 
 Promote general education and awareness in relation to disaster management. 
 Perform such other functions as the NDMC may require it to perform. (NA, 
2010) 
Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) 
 Formulate the provincial disaster management policy obtaining the approval 
of the Provincial Commission. 
 Coordinate and monitor the implementation of the National Policy, National 
Plan, and Provincial Plan. 
 Examine the vulnerability of different parts of the Province to different 
disasters and specify prevention or mitigation measures. 
 Lay down guidelines to be followed for preparation of disaster management 
plans by the Provincial Departments and District Authorities. 
 Evaluate preparedness at all governmental or non-governmental levels to 
respond to disaster and to enhance preparedness. 
 Coordinate response in the event of disaster. 
 Give directions to any Provincial department or authority regarding actions to 
be taken in response to Disaster. 
 Promote general education, awareness, and community training in this regard. 
 Provide necessary technical assistance or give advice to district authorities and 
local authorities for carrying out their functions effectively. (NA, 2010) 
 Advise the Provincial Government regarding all financial matters in relation 
to disaster management. 
 Examine the construction in the area and if it is of the opinion that the 
standards laid down have not been followed and it may direct the following 
same to secure compliance of such standards. 
 Ensure that communication systems are in order and disaster management 
drills are being carried out regularly. 
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 Perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the National or 
Provincial Authority. 
 Prepare a disaster management plan including district response plan for the 
province. 
 Co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of the National Policy, 
Provincial Policy, National Plan, Provincial Plan and District Plan. 
 Ensure that areas in the district vulnerable to disasters are identified and 
measures for the prevention of disasters and mitigation of its effects are 
undertaken by the departments of the Government at the district level as well 
as by the Local Authorities. 
 Ensure that the guidelines for prevention, mitigation, preparedness and 
response measures as laid down by the National Authority and Provincial 
Authority are followed by all departments of the government at the district 
level and local authorities in the District. 
 Give directions to different authorities at the district level and local authorities 
to take such other measures for the prevention and mitigation of disasters as 
may be necessary. 
 Lay down guidelines for preparation of disaster management plans by the 
departments of the Government at the districts level and local authorities in 
the district. 
 Monitor the implementation of disaster management plans prepared by the 
departments of the Government at the district level. 
 Lay down guidelines to be followed by the departments of the Government at 
the district level. 
 Organize and coordinate specialized training programmers for different levels 
of officers, employees and voluntary rescue workers in the district. 
 Facilitate community training and awareness programmers for the prevention 
of disasters or mitigation with the support of local authorities, governmental 
and non-governmental organizations. 
 Set up, maintain, review, and upgrade the mechanism for early warnings and 
dissemination of proper information to public. 
 Prepare, review, and update district level response plans and guidelines. (NA, 
2010) 
District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) 
 Co-ordinate with, and give guidelines to local authorities in the district to 
ensure that pre-disaster and post-disaster management activities in the district 
are carried out promptly and effectively. 
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 Review development plans prepared by the departments of the Government at 
the district level, statutory, authorities or local authorities with a view to make 
necessary provisions therein for prevention of disaster or mitigation. 
 Identify places and buildings which could, in the event of a disaster situation, 
be used as relief centers or camps and make arrangements for water supply 
and sanitations in such buildings or places. 
 Establish stockpiles of rescue and relief materials or ensure preparedness to 
make such materials available at a short notice. 
 Provide information to the Provincial Authority relating to different aspects of 
disaster management. 
 Encourage the involvement of non-governmental organizations and voluntary 
social-welfare institutions working at the grassroots level in the district for 
disaster management. 
 Ensure communication systems are in order and disaster management drills 
are carried out periodically. 
 Perform such other functions as the Provincial Government or Provincial 
Authority may assign to it or as it deems necessary for disaster management in 
the district. (NA, 2010) 
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APPENDIX D.  INDONESIAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
AUTHORITIES 
BNPB is the lead authority and responsible to coordinate and implement a 
planned, integrated, and comprehensive disaster management policy at the national and 
local level. According to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 24 of 2007 
concerning the Disaster Management, BNPB, and BPBD have responsibilities as follows: 
Indonesia’s National Disaster Management Authority (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana [BNPB]) 
 Establish regulation and direction on disaster relief effort, which  comprise 
national disaster preparedness, emergency response during HADR operation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction after disaster in a fair and equitable method. 
 Establish the standardization and implementation of disaster management 
needs based on laws and regulations. 
 Submit information to the community for disaster prevention activities. 
 Report the disaster relief operations to the President in normal situation 
monthly, and any times in a state of emergency.  
 Utilize and responsible for national and international aid. 
 Responsible for the use of National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan 
Belanja Nasional [APBN]). 
 Perform other responsibilities in accordance with the regulation. 
 Develop regulation to establish the District Disaster Management Agency 
(Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah [BPBD]).  
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The Local Board of Disaster Relief (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah 
[BPBD]) 
 Establish regulation and directive based on the policy of local government and 
the national authority (BNPB) on disaster management efforts, which 
comprise disaster preparedness, emergency response during HADR operation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction after disaster in a fair and equitable method 
 Establish a standard as well as the necessities for disaster management 
operations based on legislation. 
 Construct, establish, and inform the hazard maps 
 Prepare and establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for disaster 
management. 
 Accomplish disaster management operations on local territory 
 Report the disaster management to the local head in normal conditions once a 
month, and in a state of emergency at all times 
 Control the distribution of cash and goods 
 Be responsible for the usage of the budget that is received from the local 
budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah [APBD]) 
 Perform other obligations in accordance with legislation.  
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APPENDIX E. RESPONSE FROM MAJOR GENERAL ASGHAR 
NAWAZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL NDMA (2015–APRIL 2017) 
The following are Major General Asghar Nawaz’s replies to the questions 
forwarded by our team: 
 
1. Does your organization have a set of rules/protocols / SOPs to coordinate with 
civil organizations and can you quote same, please?  
 
The National Disaster Management Ordinance 2006 (later National Disaster Management 
Act 2010) empowers National Disaster Management Authority to utilize all resources of 
civil organizations including Armed Forces of Pakistan in the wake of any disaster 
situation. The Act also envisages utilization of resources held with UN agencies, 
international non-government organizations (INGOs), non-government organizations 
(NGOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs). In order to utilize resources held with all 
stakeholders, a number of rules / protocols / SOPs have been developed which provide 
broad guidelines to be followed by all. Some of the majors protocols develop are as 
follows:- 
a. National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP), 2013–22 is prepared and is 
followed towards provision of better services to the affected ones. 
b. National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) - Under revision 
c. National Disaster Risk Management Framework Pakistan 
d. National DRR Policy 2013 
e. National Contingency Plan to Manage Industrial /Technical Disasters 
f. SOPs in emergency situation 
g. National Monsoon Contingency Response Directive 2015 
h. National Monsoon Contingency Plan 
i. Provincial Disaster Risk Management Planning Guidelines July 2007 
j. District Disaster Risk Management Planning Guidelines July 2007 
k. Guidelines for minimum standards of relief. 
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In the event of a disaster, all stakeholders including Government Ministries/Departments/
Organizations, Armed Forces, INGOs, NGOs, and UN Agencies work through and form 
part of the NDMA to conduct one window operations. 
Functions of the National Disaster Management Authority are as follows:- 
a. Act as the implementing, coordinating, and monitoring body for disaster 
management; 
b. Prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National Commission; 
c. Implement, co-ordinate, and monitor the implementation of the national policy; 
d. Lay down guidelines for preparing disaster management plans by different 
Ministries or departments and the Provincial Authorities; 
e. Provide necessary technical assistance to the Provincial Governments and the 
Provincial Authorities for preparing their disaster management plans in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Commission; 
f. Coordinate response in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster; 
g. Lay down guidelines for or give directions to the concerned Ministries or 
Provincial Governments and the Provincial Authorities regarding measures to be 
taken by then, in response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster; 
h. For any specific purpose or for general assistance, requisition the services of any 
person and such person shall be a co-opted member and exercise such power as 
conferred upon him by the Authority in writing; 
i. Promote general education and awareness in relation to disaster management; 
j. Perform such other functions as the National Commission may require it to 
perform.  
Other than these plans and SOPs; certain MOUs have been agreed upon with major Civil 
Organizations like PIA, NLC, FWO, and Armed Forces of Pakistan. Moreover, at the 
regional level SAARC countries have also formulated and validated guidelines with 




2. During 2005 earthquake, what coordination challenges did your organization face 
while coordinating with civilian organizations whether national or international?  
 
At the time of earthquake of 2005, the Disaster Management System did not exist in the 
present form. In fact the earthquake 2005 was a wakeup call which highlighted the need 
to establish a comprehensive system for disaster management at all levels. At that time, 
only the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) existed with establishment of Earthquake 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA) in the immediate aftermath. The 
response to the earthquake of 2005 is considered as one of the best practices of the world 
and the efforts and challenges have been documented. Following were some of the 
coordination challenges: 
 Lack of interagency coordination. 
 Channelization of non-government/private and international actors. 
 Deployment of foreign military contingent 
 Corporation with foreign military contingents. 
 Logistic issues. 
 Government officials were unavailable; due to the earthquake, some were dead; 
some were attending to their deceased relatives; some were in shock and 
confused; consequently, there was a total dependency on the military to organize 
relief efforts and to create a response structure. However, the Pakistan 
government reacted quickly and rushed to provide relief and restore basic 
services. 
 Lack of an “initial response” - government had no detailed plan for disaster 
response. 
 Inability of Local Security forces: Since the local security forces were unable to 
perform basic functions, the Pakistan military was charged with coordinating the 
emergency response. 
 Strain of Logistics and Resources: The terrain and sheer scale of the disaster 
required unprecedented logistics and resources. Since practically all the land 
communications were destroyed, and there was a lack of satellite cell/mobile-
phones, these were the contributing factors towards the initial lack of coordination 
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 Lack of Updated Maps: Many staff members identified problems with maps. They 
used Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for locations and the maps were found to 
be inaccurate. 
 Lack of Information Sharing: Information sharing consisted of only organic 
information. Initially there was only a trickle of information. 
 Lack of a Comprehensive Information Management Structure 
 
3. As a result of post-2005 earthquake analysis, has your organization come up with 
some particular recommendations/measures to address the coordination challenges?   
 
Post-earthquake analysis allowed certain recommendations. Based on the experience of 
the 2005 earthquake, disaster management ordinance later Act, was promulgated and, 
disaster management system including NDMA, PDMAs were established. Accordingly, 
NDMA formulated polices plans and SOPs which amply address the coordination 
aspects.  
 A dedicated permanent disaster management body should be established to ensure 
a speedy, unified response to any disaster. This must be a ‘one window’ 
operation.  
 In the wake of a disaster, arrangements should be made for effective information 
management enabling monitoring, collation, and dissemination of information to 
all stakeholders. There should also be proper secretariat support for disaster 
management, possibly with secondments from key partners under pre-determined 
agreements.  
Rescue 
 Specialized search and rescue teams equipped with the latest equipment and 
trained personnel should be available domestically to participate in rescue 
missions and avoid the dependence on foreign rescue teams. 
 A central database should be maintained of personnel and equipment available 
with all organizations. 
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 Training in rescue operations should also be provided at the school, college, and 
university level. 
 Arrangements must be made to ensure members of the public have easy access to 
information and can get their queries (about loved ones, what donations to give, 
etc.) addressed quickly. These could include posting updated information on a 
website, setting up call centers, giving telephone numbers of personnel on ground. 
 
Relief 
 The arrival of relief support from lots of different sources (aid agencies, NGOs, 
civil society, individuals) should be anticipated and mechanisms put in place to 
ensure coordination and prevent wastage/duplication. 
 For effective relief operations geographic (and/or sectoral) areas of responsibility 
should be assigned from the outset and strictly implemented. 
 The presence of national and particularly international experts should be availed 
for capacity building of local personnel and planning of reconstruction work. 
 Local community participation in relief and recovery efforts should be 
encouraged so as to avoid a ‘dependency mentality’ and speed up the recovery 
process.  
 
4. What tools for better coordination were used in the 2005 earthquake and can you 
share the same?  
 
No elaborate coordination mechanism existed at the time of the 2005 earthquake. All 
tools and SOPs were formulated after the raising of disaster management authorities. 
 
5. Does your organization depend on the military for the provision of tools (the 
internet, wireless, communication network, satellite communication, video 
conferences) or do you use your own resources?  
 
As per the NDM Act 2010, Armed Forces of Pakistan are part and parcel of the 
Government response mechanism. Resources held with them can be utilized as when 
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needed by District, Provincial, and National DMAs, depending upon the quantum of 
disaster. Comprehensive guidelines have been developed for the purposes. 
NDMA has an elaborate communication system available with the other disaster 
management authorities including video conferencing capability. Moreover, NDMA has 
in its inventory state-of-the-art wireless communication systems, some of which have 
been received through donations from friendly countries (but need approval of PTA 
before usage). In addition to the above, NDMA developed an indigenous capacity to 
respond to disasters through: 
 Establishment of an elaborate warehouse system in the country.  
 Establishment of effective Logistic supply chain management system. 
 Capacity to support 0.3 M people. 
 21000 M Tons of NFIs stocking capability. 
 Standardized Inventory for all regions of the country. 
 Preparation of policy guidelines.  
 
6. Does your organization conduct regular joint training/exercises with your 
counterparts (civil organizations, UN, or other NGOs)? What are the major features 
of the training?  
 
NDMA has established a training institute of its own; i.e., the National Institute of 
Disaster Management (NIDM), which is responsible for the capacity building of all 
government and non-government stakeholders.  
Modules for various courses including simulation exercises have been developed. 
The training is imparted on the subjects like formulation of plans, hazard mitigation, 
disaster risk reduction/management, response & recovery mechanisms, and rehabilitation 
& reconstruction.  
Frequent simulation exercises at National, Division, and District level are conducted to 
enhance the response capacity of stakeholders. A case in point is simulation exercises 
conducted with the support of WFP Readiness Initiative Team.  
School safety, urban search & rescue, and industrial hazard mitigation exercises are also 
conducted in timely sessions.  
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Training and capacity building of the community is also thoroughly practiced with 
intervals. 
Capacity Building trainings with the help of UN partners and PEER trainings are also 
some of the capacity building ventures undertaken by NDMA.  
 
7. While operating in Human Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, what 
Frameworks / international rules & regulations does your organization consult for 
operating with the NGOs or own government / civil organizations?  
 
Guidelines and coordination mechanisms have been developed in coordination with 
OCHA for smooth utilization of resources held with UN agencies, NGOs, and Civil 
Organizations. The guidelines include assessment procedures and distribution of relief.  
Presently NDMA is developing Host Nation Support Guidelines for Foreign Assistance 
in Disaster Response with the help of ADPC.   
 
8. While operating with NGOs / civil organizations in disaster relief; which 
organization had minimal interoperability challenges?  
 
One of the key aspects that worked throughout the recovery was interoperability, which 
was high. One factor that contributed to success was cross-fertilization of skills.  
 NDMA is a hybrid organization with officers from military, civil bureaucracy, 
technocrats, people with experience of working in UN Organizations and NGOs, 
so these people have contacts with their counterparts in other organizations as a 
result.  
 Many of the staff have international exposure so they support by bringing with 
them new skills and experiences. These opportunities for skills transfer are 
generally valuable, not just during an emergency.  
 
9. From a Civil – Military coordination point of view, which operation does your 
organization take as a reference point being the most successful? What are the key 
reasons for this success as per your organization?  
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Management of Floods of 2010, 2011, Earthquake of 2015, and foreign relief operations 
post Nepal Earthquake can be taken as reference points in this regard. Following are the 
some of the key reasons:- 
 Establishment of joint civil-military/multi-agency set up in NEOC of NDMA. 
 Coordination mechanism adopted to enhance civil military cooperation at 
national, provincial, and district level. 
 Working understanding between the agencies. 
 Detailed SOPs and guidelines being developed for the purpose. 
 
10. Is there some training course focusing on Civil – Military Coordination 
organized / attended by your organization members? 
 
Primarily no specific course focusing on civil-military coordination is organized by 
NIDM. However, in the past such trainings have been organized with the help of 
UNOCHA and were attended by officials of the military and NDMA. NIDM has 
developed training modules of other courses like disaster risk reduction/management and 




APPENDIX F.  INTERVIEW WITH MR. LUKE BECKMAN, 
DIRECTOR OF FIELD AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, 
AMERICAN RED CROSS  
 
1. Does your organization have set of rules/protocols / SOPs to coordinate with 
Military and other Humanitarian organizations and can you quote same, please?  
 
On the on-set, let me make a high-level comment in the beginning that Red Cross 
operates internationally as an independent societ; at the same time we are linked with 
other societies as a federation. American Red Cross (ARC), domestically engages the 
U.S. government to support relief operations and internationally ARC interacts with other 
Red Cross/Crescent (RC) societies. For example, in the U.S., ARC has a Congressional 
charter and FEMA looks towards RC to support in their mandate of mass care to execute 
the relief operations. ARC takes the lead role in providing three things which are shelter, 
food, and comfort. In the U.S., we would normally coordinate with the National Guard to 
execute relief operations. There is a set procedure by which the Host Nation (HN) 
initiates a request for assistance to the RC headquarters in Geneva through the domestic/
local Red Cross/Crescent society. Subsequently, headquarters asks the nearby societies 
and those already engaged in the area, who can support in that area and accordingly 
assistance is rendered. ARC has sufficient Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) tools, and ARC may go internationally in a support role with such capability under 
the local societies. While operating internationally, the lead RC society coordinates with 
the HN military or government body as the case may be. 
 
2. What coordination challenges did your organization face while coordinating with 
military / civilian organizations (whether national or international) during 
operations?  
 
In any disaster relief operation, the biggest challenge is the well-established relationships 
with the locals and their governments. One of the important tasks of a local NGO worker 
is to develop a relationship with locals, so that in case of a disaster the relief teams can 
coordinate well, as quickly as possible. ARC normally responds to 60 disasters in the 
U.S. and that too at individual house/ single-family level, to build a relationship. Once the 
relationships are established it facilitates free flow of information sharing, which is the 
second biggest challenge in coordinating the relief. ARC has representation in almost 
every state where they operate in Incident Command Systems (ICS) and they have 
external relations teams, which ensure that local reps have good working relations with 
other agencies, media, and governments. They not only respond to the disaster but they 
also work with them in pre-disaster planning and rehabilitation phase. 
 
3. As a result of post operational analysis, has your organization come up with some 
particular recommendations/measures to address the coordination challenges?   
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An important innovation in improving the relations with local government in order to 
better coordinate the relief is that a local Liaison Officer (LO) has been placed to work 
side-by-side with local town councilor/mayor to ensure that there is real time two-way 
communication and coordination. These LOs are empowered with useful information 
about pre-positioning of stocks and other real time information so that they can play role 
in making well-informed decisions. This strategy has been adopted after the lesson we 
learned in Hurricane Katrina and it has proved to be very effective, recently, in 
Louisiana. 
 
5. Does your organization depend on the military for the provision of tools (internet, 
wireless, communication network, satellite communication, video conferences) or 
you use your own resources?  
 
ARC is largely independent and self-sustaining with regards to communication networks. 
However, ARC does not have an interface to their network as it is a low-tech 
organization. Normally they communicate within and with other partners using cell 
phones, laptops, and the internet. While operating with the military, domestically, the 
primary interface would be phone calls, emails, and/ or they may allow interfacing into 
each other’s system. 
 
6. Does your organization conduct regular joint training/exercises with your 
counterparts (civil organizations, UN,  the military, or other NGOs)? What are the 
major features of the training?  
 
ARC does not host joint exercises; however, we do conduct different in-house training 
and exercises with our own workforce. In the U.S., often the government hosts joint 
exercises during the planning phase for some slow on-set disasters, and ARC as per 
available capacity provides input to facilitate better planning and efficient pre-positioning 
of resources.  
 
7. While operating in Human Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, what 
Frameworks / international rules & regulations does your organization consult for 
operating with the militaries / NGOs or own government / civil organizations?  
 
In the U.S., government agencies work under the framework of NRF; however, within 
the RC, we operate as per the framework of ICS or as per the UN cluster system; that 
works the same as ICS. All the agencies communicate and coordinate with the lead 
agency and that lead agency coordinates with military to seek support, be it in health 
care, transportation, or power. Internationally, non-existence of a common framework is 
a big problem; having said that in such a situation foreign players see where the power 
flows from to understand who is willing to support the relief operation and that becomes 
in-charge from the HN’s side to coordinate. In such scenarios, UNOCHA plays its role to 
reduce the gap and directly coordinate with HN agency for a successful effort.  
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8. While operating with militaries / NGOs / civil organizations in disaster relief, 
which organization had minimal interoperability challenges?  
 
In the U.S., the National Guard (NG) has a unique culture in place from their senior 
leadership down to the soldier level, to say “yes” to any sort of assistance we are in need 
of, during relief operation. If a request came in, the NG did its best to meet the need. 
Some of our leadership in the ARC came from the NG. One of our new mottos is “get to 
Yes, never say No.” If you ask me, can I get 100 meals and my initial thought is that I 
don’t have 100 meals, I will not say that, instead, I’ll try to find someone who can 
provide 100 meals. We are always striving to be more collaborative; we want to be an 
organization that works with many players and never says no to anyone. It is about 
changing the culture of an organization, and it starts at the top. There is a culture in 
NGOs, not to back the one who commits a mistake. One has to know that the leadership 
supports him and has his back. If one commits a mistake and loses his position, what does 
that tell the other young leaders? But if the leaders work with him, ask what can we learn 
from this mistake, this way they encourage everyone to try new things. 
 
9. From a Civil – Military coordination point of view, which operation does your 
organization take as a reference point being the most successful? What are the key 
reasons for this success as per your organization?  
 
There is no one single operation as the frequency of our operations is very high and we 
try to do better than the previous one. ARC participates and hosts also in post-action 
reviews; that is the forum where we analyze what went well and what went wrong to 
draw the lessons, and we make sure that such a problem does not happen again. We 
employ smart people to understand the problem and come up with a plan in steady state 
operation. 
 
At the end, Mr. Luke Beckman shared a document, prepared by a former U.S. Navy 
Commander Dr. Eric Rasmussen, an old colleague of his in ARC, which is called the 10, 
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